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Shareholders in public companies vote not by attending the 
meeting but by exercising their rights under the federal proxy rules.1  
 
* Professor of Law, Director, Corporate & Commercial Law Program, University of 
Denver Sturm College of Law. 
 1  See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic:  Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. 
L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1993) (“It seems to me that the heart of the problem lies in the 
failure of corporate practice to reproduce through the proxy medium an annual 
meeting substantially equivalent to the old meeting in person.  I know that the old-
fashioned meeting cannot be revived.  Admittedly, that is impossible.  It is not 
impossible, however, to utilize the proxy machinery to approximate the conditions of 
the old-fashioned meeting.”) (quoting Robert H. O’Brien, SEC Comm’r, Address 
Before the Conference Board 3 (Jan. 21, 1943)); see generally Robert B. Thompson, 
Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as First in Corporate 
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Recognizing this,2 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“the 
Commission” or “SEC”) has at times described the proxy rules as 
neutral in effect, designed only to provide shareholders with the same 
rights accorded under state law.3  In fact, this has often not been the 
case.  Over their eighty-year development, the rules have often reduced 
rather than complemented the rights otherwise available to 
shareholders at these meetings. 
This can be seen with particular clarity in connection with the 
erosion of shareholder voting rights.  Under the proxy rules, Rule 14a-
8 permits shareholders to submit a proposal for inclusion in the proxy 
statement.4  The rule contains procedural conditions and substantive 
restrictions that allow for the exclusion of some proposals.  
Shareholders seeking to avoid these limitations may either distribute 
their own proxy statement, an often prohibitively expensive step, or, 
under state law, wait for the meeting and make the proposal there.5 
To the extent that shareholders opt for the latter approach, the 
proxy rules all but guarantee that the effort will fail.  Upon execution 
of a proxy card, Rule 14a-4 allows for the involuntary transfer to 
 
Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779 (2004).   
 2  See U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 77TH CONG., REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR 
AMENDMENT TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 
PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 35 
(Comm. Print 1941) (“Since ownership of securities . . . is today effected almost 
entirely by proxies, the provisions of Section 14 are of paramount importance.”). 
 3  See Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 172 (1943) (testimony of former SEC 
Chairman Purcell) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1493] (“[T]he rights that we are 
endeavoring to assure to the stockholders are those rights that he has traditionally had 
under State law, to appear at the meeting; to make a proposal; to speak on that 
proposal at appropriate length; and to have his proposal voted on.”).  See also 
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, 2007 WL 2175940, at *3 (July 
27, 2007) (“Thus, the federal proxy authority is not intended to supplant state law, but 
rather to reinforce state law rights with a sturdy federal disclosure and proxy 
solicitation regime.”); Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, 
Exchange Act Release No. 30849, 1992 WL 151037, at *12 (June 23, 1992) (“While 
voting rights and the right to vote by proxy generally are determined by state law, 
federal regulation of the proxy solicitation process serves to make that right 
meaningful.”). 
 4  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012).  
 5  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007) (“Under state 
law, shareholders had the inherent right to make proposals or nominate directors 
from the floor of the meeting.”).  Data on the number of proposals made at the 
meeting but not appearing in the proxy statement is apparently unavailable.  
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40018, 
1998 WL 254809, at *15 (May 21, 1998) (“We do not routinely record information on 
the number of ‘small businesses’ that receive non-rule 14a-8 proposals each year, since 
non-14a-8 proposals do not necessarily lead to a submission to the Commission.”). 
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management of discretionary authority to vote against any proposal 
that arises from the floor of the meeting and does not otherwise appear 
in a proxy statement.6  The transfer even applies where adequate notice 
of an impending proposal is provided and management has sufficient 
time and opportunity to obtain voting instructions from shareholders.  
Shareholders can only avoid the transfer of discretionary authority by 
circulating their own proxy statement or refusing to return the proxy 
card.  Such a refusal forces the shareholder either to forego the right 
to vote or to attend the meeting and cast a ballot in person.  Neither 
represents a satisfactory solution. 
The policy reflected in Rule 14a-4 has been justified as beneficial 
to shareholders.  The approach is convenient.7  The proxy process is 
rendered more efficiently.8  Imposing the restrictions avoids 
shareholder “confusion.”9  In fact, the discretionary authority provided 
under Rule 14a-4 is better understood as the byproduct of an uneven 
evolution in the development of the proxy rules.  For much of the 
history of these provisions, shareholders were less organized and 
showed only modest interest in their impact on corporate governance.  
The rules, therefore, mostly reflected the interests of issuers.  Rather 
than duplicating rights available at the meeting, they were used to 
restrict or reduce those rights.10 
The approach to discretionary voting contained in Rule 14a-4 
raises serious governance concerns.  The system effectively forces 
shareholders to submit proposals under Rule 14a-8 for inclusion in the 
proxy statement.  Only in these circumstances must management 
provide shareholders with the explicit right to vote for or against the 
matter and forgo the use of discretionary authority.11  At the same time, 
however, reliance on Rule 14a-8 can have significant drawbacks.  A 
 
 6  See infra Section III.  The transfer must be disclosed. 
 7  See infra note 43. 
 8  See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate 
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 
16356, 1979 WL 173198, at *4 (Nov. 21, 1979) (“It was further argued that the proposal 
would not only reduce the accuracy and efficiency of the tabulation process, but also 
would overly complicate the process of voting on a proxy card, thereby fostering 
shareholder disinterest and confusion.”).  
 9  See infra notes 45, 96. 
 10  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8 in the Corporate Governance 
Process, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 152 (2016) [hereinafter Brown, The Evolving Role 
of Rule 14a-8] (with respect to Rule 14a-8, the Rule for the first five decades of existence 
“existed in an environment largely defined by issuer consternation and shareholder 
disinterest”).  
 11  Even with matters specifically listed in the proxy card, management can exercise 
discretion over matters left blank.  See infra Section III.A. 
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complicated provision often interpreted in an arbitrary fashion, 
shareholders must incur the expense of crafting a proposal that avoids 
application of the many substantive and procedural hurdles contained 
in the rule.  In addition, they often must undertake the costs of defense 
when management seeks omission of the proposal from the proxy 
statement.12 
More importantly, however, the rule is simply not available for 
some types of proposals.  The Commission has categorically excluded 
entire topics from Rule 14a-8.  Proposals are, for example, routinely 
excluded to the extent addressing the rotation, ratification or 
qualification of the outside auditor, despite the obvious importance of 
the topic to shareholders.13  A proposal in this area, therefore, can only 
be made through a separate proxy solicitation or from the floor of the 
meeting; reliance on Rule 14a-8 is entirely foreclosed.  Yet when the 
proposal is made from the floor, management routinely obtains the 
discretionary voting authority to ensure defeat.14 
This Article will trace the evolution of discretionary voting power 
under the proxy rules.  The history is one of continuous expansion of 
the company’s right to such authority.  The Article will discuss the 
imperfect, indeed ineffective, mechanisms that can be used to prevent 
the transfer of discretionary voting authority from shareholders to 
management.  Finally, the Article will examine possible changes in the 
regulatory regime that can address these concerns. 
II. THE ANNUAL MEETING PROCESS 
The requirements for shareholder meetings are governed by state 
law.  For shareholders who cannot or will not physically attend the 
 
 12  See Shareholder Developments During the 2015 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN (July 15, 
2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/Shareholder-Proposal-
Developments-During-the-2015-Proxy-Season.aspx (noting that issuers filed requests 
with the SEC to omit proposals with respect to 318 out of the 943 proposals submitted 
by shareholders).  
 13  See infra Section V. 
 14  See State Street Corp., Proxy Solicitation Material (Schedule 14A), at 26 (March 
2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93751/000009375103000018/proxy2003
.htm (“The Board of Directors does not know of any other matters that may be 
presented for action at the meeting, except that management has been informed that 
stockholders intend to submit a proposal to amend the By-Laws of the Corporation . . .  
If the proposal is properly brought before the meeting by the stockholders, the proxy 
holders intend to use their discretionary authority to vote against the proposal.”).  The 
proposal was made at the meeting and was defeated by a vote of 289,214,115 to 170 
(with 1,231 shares abstaining or not voting).  See State Street Corp., Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q), at 34 (Mar. 31, 2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93751/000092701603002508/d10q.htm. 
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meeting, voting takes place through the proxy process.  For public 
companies, the proxy process is regulated by federal law and overseen 
by the SEC.15 
A. State Law Requirements 
Companies typically hold an annual meeting of shareholders at 
which directors are elected.16  Shareholders receive notice of the 
meeting and have the right to attend and vote their shares.17  For those 
present at the meeting, shares are typically voted by ballot.18  
Shareholders may also designate a proxy or agent to attend the 
meeting and vote the shares in accordance with their instructions.19 
Shareholders in attendance can nominate directors or make 
proposals from the floor of the meeting.20  Described as a “default 
rule,”21 the right to present business at the meeting is a mix of common 
and statutory law.22  Shareholders do not, however, have an unlimited 
 
 15  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (2012). 
 16  See Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 44 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The 
obligation to hold an annual meeting at which directors are to be elected, either for 
one year or for staggered terms, as the charter may provide, is one of the very few 
mandatory features of Delaware corporation law.”).  
 17  Fisch, supra note 1, at 1136 (“Presence at the annual meeting carries with it 
certain common-law rights, such as the right to nominate a candidate for the board of 
directors or to propose resolutions or transactions within the authority of the 
shareholders, such as a shareholder resolution or bylaw amendment.”). 
 18  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(e) (2009) (providing that all elections to the 
board shall be by ballot).  See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231(b) (2000) (requiring 
inspector of election to determine “the shares represented at a meeting and the 
validity of proxies and ballots” to “[c]ount all votes and ballots” and to “[c]ertify their 
determination of the number of shares represented at the meeting, and their count of 
all votes and ballots”).  Proxy cards do not give to owners the same degree of choice.  
See infra note 168. 
 19  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22(a) (2016) (allowing a shareholder to vote 
shares “in person or by proxy”). 
 20  See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1066 (1998) (“Under state 
law, labor and other shareholders can submit proposals for shareholder approval at 
the annual shareholders’ meeting, subject to compliance with any applicable bylaw 
provisions.”). 
 21  JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch. 
2008) (“CNET is correct that . . . if the Notice Bylaw is interpreted to apply only to 14a-
8 proposals, then ‘any of CNET’s thousands of stockholders are free to raise for the 
first time and present any proposals they desire at the Annual Meeting.’  Although this 
may sound daunting, it is the default rule in Delaware.”), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 
2008).  
 22  George Ponds Kobler, Shareholder Voting Over the Internet: A Proposal for Increasing 
Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance, 49 ALA. L. REV. 673, 675 (1998) (“State 
common law and statutory law gave shareholders the right to make proposals and vote 
at corporation meetings.”).  Delaware provides that in addition to the election of 
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right to make proposals.  Proposals can be ruled out of order to the 
extent they are inconsistent with the law or otherwise in violation of 
applicable bylaws and charter provisions.23  The degree to which bylaws 
can impose limits on these common law rights by, for example, 
requiring a minimum share ownership threshold,24 is unclear.25 
The most common restriction imposed by management on 
shareholder proposals concerns advance notice requirements.26  
Companies usually require that shareholders provide notice of any 
 
directors “[a]ny other proper business may be transacted at the annual meeting.”  See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(e) (2009).  Some types of proposals appear expressly 
authorized by statute.  This includes, for example, the right of shareholders to propose 
bylaws.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2009) (“After a corporation other than a 
nonstock corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, 
amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote.”).  See also 
Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[T]he purposes 
served by the annual meeting include affording to shareholders an opportunity to 
bring matters before the shareholder body, as provided by the corporations charter 
and bylaws, such as bylaw changes.”).  
 23  Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84 HARV. L. REV. 700, 
702–03 (1971) (“Stockholders have no right, however, to obtain discussion or a vote 
on every proposal, since the chairman of the meeting may rule a proposal out of order 
if the proposal is not a proper subject for shareholder action under state law or the 
charter or by-laws of the company.”). 
 24  Ashford Hospitality Prime, Inc., Proxy Solicitation Material (Schedule 14A), at 
45 (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1574085/000104746915003607/a222422
9zdef14a.htm (seeking shareholder approval of bylaw that would limit nominees and 
proposals to shareholders “of record” that owned at least 1 percent of the shares 
continuously for at least one year).  The proposal, however, was not approved by 
shareholders.  See Ashford Hospitality Prime, Inc., Current Report  
(Form 8-K) (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1574085/000157408515000037/ahp2015
annualshareholdervo.htm (For: 3,420,750; Against: 15,309,178; Abstain: 15,499; 
Broker non-votes:  1,992,587).  A majority of shareholders also voted against the 
proposal at Ashford Hospitality Trust.  See Ashford Hospitality Trust, Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1232582/000123258215000079/aht2015
annualshareholdervo.htm. 
 25  Some have argued that they have the right to impose limits on these types of 
rights.  See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. 
L. REV. 425, 463 (1984) (“A bylaw provision requiring minimum share ownership in 
order to bring matters before the shareholders meeting of a for-profit corporation 
would appear even more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.  If the bylaws of such a 
corporation required five percent share ownership in order to bring a matter before 
the meeting, a proposal from a shareholder holding fewer shares would be an 
improper matter for shareholder action under state law.”). 
 26  See CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d at 344 (“An advance notice bylaw is one that 
requires stockholders wishing to make nominations or proposals at a corporation’s 
annual meeting to give notice of their intention in advance of so doing.”). 
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impending proposal several months before the meeting.27  A 
shareholder who fails to provide the requisite advance notice may be 
barred from making the proposal.28 
B. Shareholder Proposals and the Proxy Rules 
Public companies are subject to the federal proxy rules.29  Rule 
14a-8 permits shareholders to include in the company’s proxy 
statement a properly submitted proposal.  Management, in turn, must 
provide shareholders with the right to vote for or against the matter.30  
Those submitting a proposal are required to attend the meeting and 
“present” the matter from the floor.31 
At one time, the requirements of Rule 14a-8 largely coexisted with 
those set out under state law.  The initial version of the rule allowed 
for the submission of a proposal by any shareholder, without reference 
to a minimum ownership threshold or holding period.32  Proposals 
were to be included so long as they constituted a proper subject for 
shareholders,33 a standard that turned on state law.34 
The overlap, however, did not last.  With the adoption of the first 
significant set of amendments to the rule in 1948,35 the Commission 
 
 27  See Harbinger Capital Partners Fund I, Ltd. v. Nw. Corp., No. 1937-N, 2006 WL 
572823, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2006) (bylaw requiring shareholder “to identify its 
slate of proposed board candidates three months in advance of the meeting”). 
 28  In the absence of these types of provisions, any of a company’s “thousands of 
stockholders are free to raise for the first time and present any proposals they desire 
at the Annual Meeting.”  CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d at 344. 
 29  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)) (proxy rules apply to companies registered under 
Section 12 of the Exchange Act). 
 30  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2012).  The impetus for the rule, however, did not 
arise from the desire to enhance the right of shareholders.  Instead, the provision was 
primarily designed to alleviate management’s obligation to disclose an impending 
shareholder proposal in the proxy statement.  See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-
8, supra note 10, at 153.  By allowing shareholders to submit the proposal for inclusion 
in the proxy statement, the Rule effectively shifted the disclosure obligations to the 
proponent. 
 31  See Rule 14a-8(h), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(h) (2012). 
 32  See Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942). 
 33  Id. 
 34  Opinion of Baldwin B. Bane, Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 WL 27415, 
at *2 (Jan. 3, 1945) (“Speaking generally, it is the purpose of Rule X-14A-7 to place 
stockholders in a position to bring before their fellow stockholders matters of concern 
to them as stockholders in such corporation; that is, such matters relating to the affairs 
of the company concerned as are proper subjects for stockholders’ action under the 
laws of the state under which it is organized.”). 
 35  Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948 
WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948).  For a discussion of the 1948 amendments, see Brown, The 
Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 154. 
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began to impose conditions that deviated significantly from the 
requirements of state law.36  The number of exclusions grew from one 
to thirteen; eligibility was made contingent upon stock holdings and 
tenure.37  Moreover, while the changes had a variety of explanation, at 
least some were apparently designed to reduce shareholder access to 
Rule 14a-8.38  As a result, increasingly broad categories of proposals 
were eligible for omission from the proxy statement but were 
permissible under state law and could be raised from the floor of the 
meeting. 
III. SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND THE PROXY CARD 
For shareholders of public companies unable or unwilling to 
attend the meeting,39 voting typically occurs through the execution of 
a proxy card.40  The card designates a third party to attend the meeting 
and vote the shares as instructed.  Because the card usually comes from 
management, the third party is invariably appointed by the company 
and is often an officer.41 
 
 36  The evolution of these changes is discussed in Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 
14a-8, supra note 10. 
 37  See Rule 14a-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2012) (requiring shareholder to 
“have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s 
securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year”); 
id. § 240.14a-8(h)(1)–(13) (listing thirteen exclusions).  These requirements and 
restrictions were generally required under state law.  See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1149 
(“No uniform state or common law principle requires that a shareholder hold one 
percent or one thousand dollars’ worth of a corporation’s stock for a minimum of one 
year before making a motion at a shareholders’ meeting.  No state law bars a 
shareholder from making the same motion or proposal in successive years, yet Rule 
14a-8(c)(12) limits a shareholder’s ability to do so.  Additionally, state law does not 
restrict shareholders to dealing with issues concerning more than five percent of the 
corporation’s total assets or extraordinary business matters.  The SEC, however, has 
imposed these limits on shareholder democracy.”). 
 38  Fisch, supra note 1, at 1149 (“Many of the restrictions imposed by the proxy 
rules can be attributed to a pragmatic effort by the SEC to limit the number of 
shareholder proposals and to restrict use of the proxy statement to issues of general 
importance to shareholders.”). 
 39  In addition to the costs of attending, institutional investors holding shares in a 
large number of issuers would need to physically attend a large number of meetings 
in a short period of time.  See infra note 118. 
 40  Listed companies are required to solicit proxies.  See NYSE Rule 402.04(A), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/sections/lcm-
sections/chp_1_5/chp_1_5_2/default.asp (“Actively operating companies are 
required to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders.”).  Of course, most owners 
today hold shares in street name accounts and execute voting instructions.  These 
documents are not proxies but are sent to brokers (or their agents) and eventually 
transferred to a proxy card.  See discussion at infra Part IV.D. 
 41  See Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., Proxy Statement (July 30, 2015), at 3, 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865436/000120677415002458/wholefood
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Under Rule 14a-4,42 the proxy card must “identify clearly and 
impartially each separate matter intended to be acted upon, whether 
or not related to or conditioned on the approval of other matters, and 
whether proposed” by the company or shareholders.43  Shareholders 
are to be “afforded an opportunity to specify by boxes” the choice of 
approval, disapproval, or abstention from “each separate matter. . . .”44  
Shares reflected in the proxy card are voted at the meeting “by means 
of a ballot.”45  The proxy can only be used for a single meeting and any 
adjournment.46 
 
s_def14a.htm (“If you grant a proxy, the persons named as proxy holders, John Mackey 
and Walter Robb, will have the discretion to vote your shares on any additional matters 
properly presented for a vote at the meeting in accordance with Texas law and our 
Bylaws.”).  Both were officers of the company.  Id. (“John Mackey and Walter Robb are 
officers of the Company and were named by our Board of Directors as proxy holders.  
They will vote all proxies, or record an abstention or withholding, in accordance with 
the directions on the proxy.  If no contrary direction is given, the shares will be voted 
as recommended by the Board of Directors.”). 
 42  The early rules indicated that companies soliciting proxies had to provide 
shareholders with a “definite means” to vote.  See Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 
WL 33169, at *1 (Aug. 11, 1938) (“In other words, the proxy must provide some 
definite means whereby the security holder may indicate how he desires his vote to be 
cast on a given proposition and whereby the authority of the holders of the proxy will 
be limited accordingly.”).  The need for a “definite means” of voting in the “form of 
proxy or otherwise” proved to be subject to abuse.  See Exchange Act Release No. 2771, 
1941 WL 36908, at *1 (Feb. 8, 1941) (“Some corporations have followed the practice 
of enclosing with the proxy a separate slip of paper on which security holders may 
indicate their vote.  The Commission has been informed that this practice has led to 
confusion in the minds of security holders, in that many did not understand that it was 
necessary to return two separate instruments to the corporation in order to specify 
their vote.”).  The Commission, therefore, mandated that voting take place on the 
proxy card.  Id. (“The proxy form itself is the generally accepted instrument through 
which a stockholder gives authority to persons to represent him at the meeting.  The 
Commission knows of no valid practical reason for separating the vote from the proxy 
itself.  It is of the opinion that the separate slip has been used in order to discourage 
security holders from exercising their voting privileges.  The Commission has 
therefore decided to amend its rules to require that the space to specify the action 
desired shall be included in the form of proxy itself.”). 
 43  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (2012).  See also Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 
1938 WL 33169, at *1 (Aug. 11, 1938) (companies must provide a mechanism for 
shareholders to “indicate how he desires his vote to be cast on a given proposition and 
whereby the authority of the holders of the proxy will be limited accordingly”). 
 44  The requirements with respect to the election of directors are somewhat 
different.  For example, shareholders do not have the right to vote against but may 
“withhold authority” for each nominee.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b) (2012).  But see 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b) (“If applicable state law gives legal effect to votes cast against 
a nominee, then in lieu of, or in addition to, providing a means for security holders to 
withhold authority to vote, the registrant should provide a similar means for security 
holders to vote against each nominee.”). 
 45  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(e) (2012). 
 46  Id. § 240.14a-4(d). 
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The rule, therefore, presupposes that shareholders will be given a 
choice on all matters to be voted upon at the meeting and that their 
shares will only be voted in accordance with the choices made on the 
proxy card.  In fact, however, the rule does not operate in such a 
fashion.  In at least two instances, a company may vote an owner’s 
shares without instruction. 
First, a proxy may provide management with the authority to vote 
the portions of the card deliberately left blank by the shareholder.47  
Second, companies can use the card to obtain discretionary authority 
to vote on matters not listed on the proxy card.  This includes proposals 
that management knows will be made from the floor well in advance 
of the meeting. 
A. Partially Completed Proxy Cards 
Rule 14a-4 provides management with the authority to vote any 
portion of the proxy card left blank by the shareholder.  First 
authorized in 1938,48 management gained the right to vote for matters 
“not specified” by the shareholder “provided that the form of proxy 
states in bold-face type how it is intended to vote the shares 
represented by the proxy in each such case.”49  Management only had 
to disclose a “bona fide intention” with respect to the unmarked 
portions of the proxy card, something that could presumably be 
changed “[i]f later events” made it “unwise to vote in the manner 
stated. . . .”50  The Commission justified the approach as a 
“convenience” for shareholders.51  Aware that the company would vote 
the shares in favor of management, shareholders benefited by avoiding 
the need to execute the entire card.52  Almost from the beginning, 
 
 47  See infra notes 48–59. 
 48  Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 WL 33169, at *3 (Aug. 11, 1938) 
(“Nothing in Regulation X-14 shall prevent the solicitation of a proxy conferring 
discretionary authority with respect to matters . . . not known or determined at the 
time of the solicitation, or with respect to elections of directors or other officials.”). 
 49  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (2012).  
 50  Notice of Proposal to Revise Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 3998, 1947 
WL 25504, at *1 (Oct. 10, 1947) (“The requirements as to the form of proxy have been 
amended to provide that where a security holder does not mark the ballot, the proxy 
holder is required to state only his bona fide intention as to the way in which the shares 
represented by the proxy will be voted.  If later events make it unwise to vote in the 
manner stated, the proxy holder may then vote the shares in his discretion.”). 
 51  Christie Nicks, Note, Voting Partially Instructed Shares by Brokers, 91 DENV. L. REV. 
ONLINE 155, 161 (2014) (“The authority apparently arose from the belief that a blank 
item on the proxy was deliberate and reflected an intention by shareholders to support 
management.”), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-
onlinearticle/2014/4/19/voting-of-partially-instructed-shares-by-brokers.html. 
 52  Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate 
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however, shareholders objected to the “convenience” as inconsistent 
with their actual intent.53  Eventually, the Commission proposed to do 
away with the authority.54  Issuers, however, objected, asserting that 
shareholders benefited from the status quo,55 would be harmed by the 
change56 and, in any event, would require “extensive reeducation” to 
adjust to any amendments.57  The Commission left the authority in 
 
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 
16104, 1979 WL 170069, at *5 (Aug. 13, 1979) (proposing release) (“Certain 
commentators, noting that shareholders are advised how unmarked proxies will be 
voted, concluded that the affirmative acts of signing the proxy card and returning it to 
the issuer were substantial evidence of a shareholder’s intention to grant the issuer 
authority to vote his shares.”).  
 53  U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Summary of Proposed Revision of Proxy Rules 
(Aug. 15, 1942), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1940/
1942_0819_SECProxyT.pdf (“Under the present rules, a number of managements 
have drafted proxies so that the failure of a security holder to indicate how he desired 
his vote cast on a particular proposal vested authority in the management to vote the 
proxy in support of its position on the proposal.  Many investors have commented that 
management should be permitted to vote only those proxies specifically marked.  It is 
proposed that this suggestion be adopted as part of the amended rules.”).  See also 
Exchange Act Release No. 16104, 1979 WL 170069, at *5 (Aug. 13, 1979) (“[S]everal 
other commentators objected to permitting issuers to vote unmarked proxies. . . .  Such 
a result may not be consistent with the intent of shareholders and could dilute the 
meaning of the vote conveyed to the issuer’s board of directors.”). 
 54  See Exchange Act Release No. 16104, 1979 WL 170069 (Aug. 13, 1979) 
(proposing release).  See also Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation 
in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange 
Act Release No. 16356, 1979 WL 173198, at *8 (Nov. 21, 1979) (adopting release) 
(“Rule 14a-4(b)(3), as proposed, would have prohibited a form of proxy from 
conferring discretionary authority to vote with respect to any matter as to which the 
security holder is afforded an opportunity to specify a choice and no specification has 
been made.”).  
 55  Exchange Act Release No. 16356, 1979 WL 173198, at *8 (Nov. 21, 1979) 
(adopting release) (“A few corporations also were concerned that disregarding 
unmarked proxies would tend to increase artificially the percentage of votes cast in 
favor of shareholder proposals, which might result in adoption of special interest 
proposals not supported by security holders on the whole.”). 
 56  Id. (“Most commentators who opposed the proposed rule asserted that a 
significant number of proxies are returned each year signed but unmarked and 
believed that there is little reason to doubt that shareholders intend an unmarked 
proxy to be voted for management’s positions.”).  Unsurprisingly, shareholders had a 
different perspective.  Id. (“One shareholder contended that an unmarked proxy 
evidenced a desire to have the security holder’s vote counted only for purposes of 
achieving a quorum at the meeting of security holders.  Shareholder intentions are 
unclear, according to another commentator, because some companies ‘attempt to 
make return of a signed and dated proxy card as automatic and unthinking a process 
as possible.’”). 
 57  Id. (“Commentators foresaw numerous problems if the rule were adopted as 
proposed.  Chief among their concerns was the fear that shareholders would continue 
to return unmarked proxies intending to grant voting authority to the proxy.  In the 
opinion of many commentators, extensive re-education efforts would be needed to 
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place58 and merely admonished companies to “make greater efforts to 
encourage securities holders to vote on the matters to be considered 
at the meeting.”59 
B. Discretionary Authority 
Perhaps the most significant diminution of shareholder voting 
rights, however, arose from the involuntary transfer of discretionary 
authority from shareholders to management.  For matters not set out 
in the proxy card, companies could obtain the right, with proper 
disclosure, to vote the shares at their discretion.  The card itself 
presented no opportunity to block the transfer.  Shareholders could 
only do so by failing to return the proxy to the company or engaging 
in a counter solicitation. 
1. Rule 14a-4(c)(1): “Unexpected” Matters 
The earliest version of the proxy rules allowed management to 
obtain discretionary authority for matters not known at the time of the 
distribution of the proxy materials.60  As one commentator described, 
the provision “provide[d] companies and other soliciting persons 
some flexibility to cope with the emergence of unanticipated matters 
that arise shortly before or during the meeting.”61  The authority was 
not, however, automatic.62  Shareholders had to be informed in “bold-
 
alter this traditional mode of shareholder response.”). 
 58  The release acknowledged the benefits accorded management.  See id. at *9 
(“The Commission is sensitive to the possibility that adoption of the rule, as proposed, 
could impede attainment of a specified percentage of votes needed to adopt measures 
important to issuers’ operations.”). 
 59  Id. (“The help minimize[s] the number of abstentions when significant 
proposals recommended by the board of directors are voted upon and to clarify the 
meaning of signed but unmarked proxies, the Commission requests issuers to make 
greater efforts to encourage security holders to vote on the matters to be considered 
at the meeting.”).  For a discussion of the voting of partially executed voting instruction 
forms, see Christie Nicks, Note, Voting Partially Instructed Shares by Brokers, 91 DENV. L. 
REV. ONLINE 155 (2014), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-
onlinearticle/2014/4/19/voting-of-partially-instructed-shares-by-brokers.html. 
 60  See Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 WL 33169 (Aug. 11, 1938).  The 
authority was not intended to apply to a proposal made by the solicitor of the proxy.  
See Aegis Corp. v. Goldman, 523 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“The general 
counsel of the S.E.C. has submitted a letter in support of plaintiff’s application.  Letter 
from Ralph E. Ferrara, Office of the General Counsel, to Judge Vincent L. Broderick 
(July 21, 1981). . . .  He urges that Rule 14a-4(c) (1) should be so interpreted that it 
does not authorize the invocation of discretionary authority to vote for proposals made 
by the proxy solicitor or proxy holder himself.”). 
 61  Schwab & Thomas, supra note 20, at 1066–67. 
 62  Aegis, 523 F. Supp. at 1278 (“Thus a proxy confers specific authority to vote with 
respect to the matters specifically designated therein, and it may (but need not) confer 
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faced type” on the surface of the proxy card.63  Nonetheless, companies 
routinely obtained the authority.64 
The use of discretionary authority allowed management, not 
shareholders, to determine the outcome of motions to adjourn and 
other unexpected items that could arise at the meeting.  Particularly 
with respect to procedural matters, the transfer of authority had a 
certain logic.  Rather than leave decisions to the random owners who 
happened to be at the meeting, the power resided in managers who 
also had a legal obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders.65  
Companies eventually obtained the explicit authority to vote on a 
variety of non-substantive matters, including approval of the minutes66 
and anything “incident to the conduct of the meeting.”67 
 
discretionary authority to vote with respect to various specified other matters.”). 
 63  Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864, at *8 (Dec. 18, 1942) 
(“Nothing in Regulation X-14 shall prevent the solicitation of a proxy conferring 
discretionary authority with respect to matters as to which the person solicited does 
not make the specification provided for above if the ballot is clearly set forth in the 
form of proxy and the form of proxy contains a statement in bold-face type indicating 
that if the ballot is not marked the shares represented by the proxy will nevertheless 
be voted in a specified manner.”).  See also Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, 
SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L.J. 635, 
663 (1950) (“But it did amend the X-14A-4(c) requirements with respect to matters 
which the solicitor is not aware at the time of the solicitation are to be presented, 
provided that a specific statement is made to that effect in the proxy form or 
statement.”).  
 64  See Comm. for New Mgmt. of Guar. Bancshares Corp. v. Dimeling, 772 F. Supp. 
230, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“The Committee proxy card contained the following line: 
‘In their discretion, the proxyholders are authorized to vote upon such other business 
as may properly come before the meeting.’  The vesting of discretionary authority in 
proxyholders is standard.  Indeed, it is advisable since any shareholder may introduce 
a question to be voted upon at a shareholder’s meeting.”). 
 65  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of 
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318 (2004) (delineating fiduciary obligations 
of the board of directors).  The Commission also took steps to prevent the authority 
from being manipulated.  The party soliciting proxies could not use the discretionary 
authority to support their own initiatives.  Proxy Rules – Comprehensive Review, 
Exchange Act Release No. 23789, 1986 WL 722059, at *4 (Nov. 10, 1986) (noting that 
the purpose of the discretionary authority provision was “only to allow the party filing 
the proxy statement to respond to proposals initiated by others”).  See also Marshall & 
Ilsley Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45426 (July 12, 1984) (declining to issue 
no action relief with respect to a shareholder resolution and that “[i]n reaching this 
conclusion, we have especially noted that this matter as to which discretionary 
authority was exercised in the voting of proxies solicited by the Company’s Board was 
a matter proposed by the Board itself”). 
 66  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(4) (2012).  
 67  Id. § 240.14a-4(c)(7).  The rules also permitted the exercise of discretionary 
authority when bona fide replacement candidates were nominated to replace those 
disclosed in the proxy materials.  See id. § 240.14a-4(c)(5).  These additions to the rule 
reflected administrative practice.  See  Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules and 
Information Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 8206, 1967 WL 88215, at *1 (Dec. 14, 
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The right to vote on a discretionary basis with respect to other 
types of “unexpected” matters, however, remained.  Moreover, 
companies were allowed to treat as “unknown” matters actually known 
to management long before the meeting date.  Initially, discretionary 
authority could only be obtained for matters unknown “at the time the 
solicitation [was] made. . . .”68  The language eventually changed to 
proposals unknown a “reasonable time” before the solicitation.69  The 
staff narrowly interpreted the requirement and declined to allow the 
use of discretionary authority where management learned of a 
proposal twelve days before the meeting.70 
Eventually, however, “reasonable time” transformed into forty-five 
days before the distribution of proxy materials from the prior year or 
the date specified in an advance notice bylaw.71  Although described as 
a “benefit” to shareholders,72 the change effectively meant that 
 
1967) (“Administrative practice of the Commission has heretofore permitted a proxy 
to confer discretionary authority with respect to the approval of the minutes of a prior 
meeting where such approval does not amount to ratification of action taken at such 
meeting, with respect to matters incident to the conduct of the meeting, and with 
respect to the election of any person to any office for which a bona fide nominee is 
named in the proxy statement and such nominee is unable to serve or for good cause 
will not serve.”).  
 68  Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948 
WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948). 
 69  Amendment of Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4775, 1952 WL 5254, at 
*4 (Dec. 11, 1952) (“A proxy may confer discretionary authority with respect to other 
matters which may come before the meeting, provided the persons on whose behalf 
the solicitation is made are not aware a reasonable time prior to the time the 
solicitation is made that any such other matters are to be presented for action at the 
meeting and provided further that a specific statement to that effect is made in the 
proxy statement or in the form of proxy.”). 
 70  Larkin v. Baltimore Bancorp, 769 F. Supp. 919, 925 (D. Md. 1991) (quoting 
statement from Gregg W. Corso, Special Counsel, Office of Tender Offers, SEC, May 
14, 1991) (internal quotations omitted) (“Consistent with Rule 14a–4, a solicitor may 
not exercise discretionary authority granted by a proxy with respect to matters known 
a reasonable time prior to the meeting.  Exercising discretionary authority with respect 
to matters known twelve days prior to the meeting does not appear consistent with the 
requirements of the rule. . . .”).  Management could rely on discretionary authority if 
providing shareholders who had already returned a proxy card with an opportunity to 
revoke the authority.  See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pittson Co., No. 89-0962, 
1989 WL 201060, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (Letter from William E. Morley, Chief 
Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, to John E. Young (June 7, 1989)) (“It is the 
staff’s view, however, that where the management is made aware of the matter in 
sufficient time before the meeting, there are two options available: either the new 
matter is reflected on a new proxy card and the security holders thus are given the 
opportunity to revoke previously given discretionary authority as to the matter or it is 
not added and the discretionary authority does not apply to the matter.”). 
 71  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (2012). 
 72  Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21 (Sept. 18, 1997) (asserting that the adoption of a 45-
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proposals submitted well before the meeting73 could be treated as 
“unknown” for purposes of the exercise of discretionary authority.74 
2. Rule 14a-4(c)(6): Proposals “Omitted” under Rule 14a-8 
In addition to “unknown” matters, companies were allowed to use 
discretionary authority to vote against proposals that were in fact 
entirely known.  Rule 14a-8 required shareholders in most cases to 
submit proposals to management 120 days prior to the date the proxy 
materials were distributed the previous year.75  As a result, management 
became aware of a proposal well before the annual meeting. 
Even when timely, however, not all of these proposals ended up 
in the proxy statement.  In some cases, the Commission issued a no-
 
day time period would “not only provide clearer guidelines for shareholders and 
companies, but also benefit investors by helping to ensure that companies are notified 
of proposals sufficiently in advance of the annual meeting to provide shareholders a 
meaningful opportunity to review related disclosures in the proxy statement”). 
 73  See Harbinger Capital Partners Fund I, Ltd. v. Nw. Corp., No. 1937-N, 2006 WL 
572823 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2006). 
 74  The release included one example.  See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder 
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40018, 1998 WL 254809, at *6 (May 21, 1998) 
(“As an example, assume a company mailed this year’s proxy materials on March 31, 
1998 for an annual meeting on May 1, 1998.  Next year, the company also schedules 
an early May annual meeting.  The notice date established by new rule 14a-4(c)(1) for 
non-14a-8 proposals is forty-five calendar days before March 31, or February 14.  Thus 
February 14, 1999 would represent the notice date for the purposes of amended rule 
14a-4(c)(1) unless a different date is established by an overriding advance notice 
provision in the company’s charter or bylaws.”).  
 75  See Rule 14a-8(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e) (2012).  The period has been steadily 
lengthened over the years.  See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 20091, 1983 WL 33272, at *4 (Aug. 16, 1983) (extending the deadline for 
submitting proposals from 90 days to 120 in order to “to give issuers and the 
Commission’s staff adequate time to process proposals”); Adoption of Amendments 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19771, 1976 WL 
160347, at *4 (Nov. 22, 1976) (extending the deadline for submitting proposals from 
70 to 90 days and noting that the Commission “believes that the inconvenience will be 
minimal and is outweighed by the fact that the new timeliness deadlines will provide 
an additional 20 days for proponents to explore all possible alternatives in connection 
with a management’s intention to omit their proposals”); Title 17—Commodity and 
Securities Exchanges, Chapter II—Securities and Exchange Commission, Exchange 
Act Release No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400, at *2 (Sept. 22, 1972) (extending the deadline 
for submitting proposals from 60 to 70 days, a change described as “technical in 
nature”); Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 
1954 WL 5772, at *1 (Jan. 6, 1954) (increasing the period from 30 to 60 days “so as to 
give more time for the consideration of security holder proposals”).  For most annual 
meetings, proposals must be submitted no earlier than 120 days from the date of 
distribution of the proxy materials during the prior year.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2) 
(2012).  Where the company did not hold an annual meeting or has changed the 
meeting date by more than 30 days, “the deadline is a reasonable time before the 
company begins to print and send its proxy materials.” Id. 
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action letter authorizing omission.76  In other instances, shareholders 
withdrew the proposal voluntarily.  Omission or withdrawal under Rule 
14a-8 did not preclude a shareholder from raising the same issue from 
the floor of the meeting.77  As a result, companies confronted the risk 
that a proposal not included in the proxy statement would nonetheless 
be considered by shareholders at the upcoming meeting. 
An early version of Rule 14a-478 allowed management to obtain 
discretionary authority to vote against proposals omitted under Rule 
14a-8.79  To do so, the company only had to disclose the intended use 
of the authority,80 although additional information was required where 
 
 76  For a description of the no action letter process, see Courtney E. Bartkus, Note, 
Appealing No-Action Responses under Rule 14a-8: Informal Procedures of the SEC and the 
Availability of Meaningful Review, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 199 (2016), 
http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-onlinearticle/2016/5/6/appealing-no-action-
responses-under-rule-14a-8-informal-proc.html. 
 77  See supra note 1.  See also Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at 
*20 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“If a shareholder submits a proposal under rule 14a-8 to be 
included in the company’s proxy materials, but the company properly excludes the 
proposal, rule 14a-4(c)(4) permits the company to exercise discretionary voting 
authority to vote uninstructed proxies against that proposal if the shareholder chooses 
an alternative route for its presentation to a vote.  The proponent may, for instance, 
intend to present the proposal from the floor of the company’s annual meeting, or 
solicit proxy votes independently by distributing its own proxy statement and form of 
proxy.”). 
 78  Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948 
WL 28695, at *1 (Nov. 5, 1948) (“Rule X-14A-4 is amended to provide that proposals 
so omitted need not be referred to in the form of proxy and that the proxy may confer 
discretionary authority with respect to such proposals.”). 
 79  The amendments were likely motivated by the simultaneous decision to expand 
the number of substantive grounds for excluding a proposal.  As originally drafted, 
Rule 14a-8 (then X-14a-7) only allowed for the exclusion of proposals that were not 
proper subjects for shareholder action.  To the extent excluded on this basis, 
shareholders presumably lacked the authority to make the same proposal at the annual 
meeting.  See, e.g., The Wash. Post Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
1447, at *3 (Feb. 22, 1973) (proposal excluded because proposing shareholders lacked 
the authority to vote on the matter; if proposal made at meeting, shareholder would 
be “ruled out of order”).  In 1948, however, the Commission added grounds for 
exclusion that went beyond the boundaries of state law.  The amendments, therefore, 
raised the possibility that a proposal omitted under Rule 14a-8 could still be made from 
the floor of the meeting.  The amendments to Rule 14a-4 made certain that 
management would have sufficient votes to ensure defeat of the proposal to the extent 
that occurred. 
 80  Pacific Enters, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 447, at *2 (Mar. 
9, 1990) (“When a shareholder proposal has been excluded pursuant to the provisions 
of rule 14a–8, the proposal may still be presented at the meeting.  Thus, issuers’ proxy 
statements should disclose the possibility that proposals omitted pursuant to rule 14a–
8 may be raised at the meeting and the proxies will be voted in the discretion of the 
proxy holders.”).  See also Schwab & Thomas, supra note 20, at 1071 (“If the company 
intends to exercise discretionary authority to vote on the excluded proposal if it is 
subsequently presented by the union on the floor at the meeting, however, then the 
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management actually knew that a proposal would be made at the 
meeting.81  The proxy card did not have to include any mechanism to 
allow shareholders to withhold the transfer of discretionary authority 
with respect to the omitted proposal. 
Initially, discretionary authority could only be used to vote against 
proposals omitted for substantive reasons.82  Amendments adopted in 
1967, however, expanded the use of discretionary voting to proposals 
omitted for any reason, including the failure to observe procedural 
formalities.83  Management could, therefore, use the authority to vote 
 
SEC has taken the position that the company must have disclosed fully in its proxy 
statement the possibility that the excluded shareholder proposal might be raised at 
the meeting and that, in such event, the proxy will be voted in the discretion of the 
holder in order to exercise discretionary authority under this rule.”). 
 81  The staff sometimes comments on the level of disclosure associated with 
discretionary authority.  One example involved a back and forth between the Office of 
Mergers & Acquisitions at the SEC and counsel for Hospitality Properties Trust.  See 
Letter from David L. Orlic, Special Counsel, Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, SEC, to 
Mark L. Kleifges, Chief Fin. Officer, Hospitality Properties Trust (Mar. 11, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/945394/000000000015014590/filename
1.pdf; see also Letter from Margaret R. Cohen, Skadden, Arps, to David L. Orlic, Special 
Counsel, Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, SEC (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
945394/000110465915019762/filename1.htm.  After another letter from the staff (see 
Letter from David L. Orlic, Special Counsel, Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, SEC, to 
Mark L. Kleifges, Chief Fin. Officer, Hospitality Properties Trust (Mar. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/945394/000000000015016176/filename1.pdf), the company agreed to 
increase the level of disclosure.  See Letter from Thomas W. Greenberg, Skadden, Arps, 
to Office of Mergers & Acquisitions, SEC (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2015/danaher-corporation-
051315-13e4-incoming.pdf.  For the disclosure on the matter included in the proxy 
statement, see Hospitality Properties Trust (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/945394/000104746915002486/a2223826
zprer14a.htm. 
 82  A proxy card could provide discretionary authority for any proposal “omitted 
from the proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to paragraph (c) of Rule X-14A-
8.”  Rule X-14A-4(c), reprinted in Amendment of Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release 
No. 4775, 1952 WL 5254, at *2–19 (Dec. 11, 1952).  Subsection (c) of Rule X-14A-8 
permitted the exclusion of proposals to the extent involving a “personal claim or 
redressing a personal grievance,” to the extent the shareholder failed to present the 
proposal at two consecutive meetings, and upon resubmission of substantially the same 
proposal without having obtained at least three percent of the votes cast.  Id. 
 83  The changes were not in the proposing release.  See Notice of Proposed 
Amendments to Proxy Rules and Information Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 8000, 
1966 WL 85608 (Dec. 5, 1966).  See also Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules and 
Information Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 8206, 1967 WL 88215, at *2 (Dec. 14, 
1967) (“Heretofore, discretionary authority was permitted by this provision only with 
respect to proposals omitted pursuant to paragraph (c) of Rule 14a-8.  The 
amendment will thus permit discretionary authority to vote with respect to proposals 
which are not submitted within the period of time specified in the rule, as well as those 
which may be omitted pursuant to paragraph (c), and with respect to proposals which 
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against proposals excluded because the shareholders missed a 
deadline or failed to provide adequate evidence of stock ownership.84  
In addition, administrative interpretations broadened application of 
the authority to proposals that did not explicitly invoke Rule 14a-885 or 
were withdrawn before the staff ruled on the no action request.86 
3. Rule 14a-4(c)(2): “Non-Rule 14a-8 Proposals” 
Discretionary authority applied to matters “unknown” before the 
meeting.  The authority also applied to proposals “omitted” under 
Rule 14a-8.87  For most of the existence of Rule 14a-4, however, timely 
 
are false or misleading.”). 
 84  In addition to proposals omitted under Rule 14a-8, discretionary authority can 
be used to vote against a proposal omitted under the antifraud provision contained in 
Rule 14a-9.  Rule 14a-4(c)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(6) (2012).  See Exchange Act 
Release No. 8206, 1967 WL 88215 (Dec. 14, 1967).  Added in 1967, the provision 
appears redundant.  The right to exclude proposals for violations of Rule 14a-9 was 
only added in 1976.  See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security 
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12999, 1976 WL 160347, at *9 (Nov. 22, 1976) 
(noting that the provision “formalize[d] a ground for omission that the Commission 
believes has been inherent in the proxy rules”).  The change made the need for a 
reference to Rule 14a-9 redundant.  Nonetheless, retention of the language suggests 
that a company can omit a proposal as misleading without relying on Rule 14a-8 and 
use discretionary authority to vote against the matter if it is subsequently raised at the 
meeting. 
 85  See Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 64007, at *5 (Feb. 14, 1997) 
(“Although the Proponent makes no reference to Rule 14a-8 in his letter (and does 
not indicate a desire to have his two proposals included in the Company’s proxy 
statement), Rule 14a-8 itself would require Texaco to include the proposals in its proxy 
materials, unless the requirements in subparagraph (a) of Rule 14a-8 are not met or 
one or more of the exceptions set forth in subparagraph (c) of Rule 14a-8 are 
applicable.  Accordingly, Texaco believes that for purposes of Rule 14a-4, Texaco’s 
omission of these proposals from its proxy statement should be viewed as being 
pursuant to Rule 14a-8.”). 
 86  Consolidated Freightways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 100550, at *1 
(Mar. 8, 1995) (“Based upon the facts presented, the Division is of the view that 
Company may in accordance with Rule 14a–4(c)(4), exercise discretionary authority 
with respect to the shareholder proposals withdrawn by Messrs. Weaver and Boyle.  In 
arriving at this position, the Division has noted that the proposals were originally 
submitted to the Company pursuant to Rule 14a–8 and that they were withdrawn after 
the Company submitted its no-action request seeking to omit the proposals under the 
cited provisions of Rule 14a–8.”). 
 87  Issuers sometimes argued that all proposals should be treated as submitted 
under Rule 14a-8 for purposes of discretionary authority.  Courts, however, rejected 
the argument.  See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pittson Co., No. 89-0962, 1989 WL 
201060, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (“The Union’s effort was markedly different from 
the stringent requirements of Rule 14a–8 to which Pittston asserts all proposals by 
shareholders are subject.  This is an extreme view and Pittston has been unable to 
supply a single authority to support it.  If true, the Court is confident that Pittston 
would by no means be the first to have defended it.  Furthermore, Pittston’s position 
ignores the essence of the rule and the tradeoff that must be endured when it is 
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submitted proposals disclaiming reliance on Rule 14a-8 (“Non-Rule 
14a-8 Proposals”) were not subject to discretionary authority.88  Instead, 
companies had to disclose the proposal in the proxy materials and 
provide shareholders with an opportunity to vote on the matter.89 
In the 1990s, however, the Commission, first by administrative 
interpretation, then through amendment to the rule, reversed this 
approach.  In Idaho Power,90 the staff permitted a company to rely on 
discretionary authority to vote against a Non-Rule 14a-8 Proposal91 so 
long as companies “advised” shareholders about the matter92 and 
specified how the shares would be voted.93  Shareholders could only 
 
invoked by shareholders.  Rule 14a–8 offers the proponent an opportunity for its 
proposal to be contained in management’s own proxy statement at no expense to the 
proponent.  In return, the proponent must comply with Rule 14a–8’s strictures.”). 
 88  Emerson & Latcham, supra note 63, at 663 (“The Commission did not adopt 
the 1948 proposal to modify the X-14A-4(b) provisions with reference to proxies 
conferring upon a solicitor discretionary authority regarding matters which he knows 
will be presented at the meeting.”). 
 89  See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 20, at 1061–62 (1998) (“If the company is 
aware of the proposal sufficiently early, then it may choose to include the union’s 
proposal and supporting statement in the company’s proxy materials, just as it would 
any shareholder proposal.  If the company decides to do this, however, ‘the proposal 
is likely to get a high vote, comparable to any “normal” shareholder proposal.  
Albertson’s and Questar handled union proposals this way [in 1996] . . . and the 
proposals drew support ranging from 21% to 38%.’”). 
 90  Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545 (Mar. 13, 1996). 
 91  See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of 
Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 620 (1997) (“A 1996 no-action 
letter, issued to the Idaho Power Company, is read by some practitioners to authorize 
the issuer to utilize the discretionary voting authority granted it by the standard proxy, 
notwithstanding Rule 14a-4, so long as the insurgent’s solicitation is limited and 
management publicly states how it intends to vote on the issue.”); see also Schwab & 
Thomas, supra note 20, at 1069 (“The SEC recently suggested, however, that 
management does not always need to include a shareholder floor proposal on the 
company’s ballot in order to exercise discretionary voting authority.”).  
 92  See Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545, at *1 (Mar. 13, 
1996) (shareholders must be “advised by the company of the nature of the proposal 
and how the company intends to vote with respect to the proposal”); see also Borg-
Warner Security Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 119943, at *1 (Mar. 14, 
1996).  At least one court indicated that this required disclosure of all “substantive” 
aspects of the proposal.  See Union of Needletrades, Indust. and Textile Emps. v. May 
Dep’t Stores Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The defendant followed 
the SEC’s recommended procedures by disclosing the substantive aspects of the 
plaintiffs’ three proposals in May’s original proxy solicitation materials.”), aff’d, 171 
F.3d 754 (2d. Cir. 1999). 
 93  See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“Under those no-action letters, a 
company that receives adequate advance notice of a non-rule 14a-8 proposal—such as 
under its advance notice bylaw—nevertheless may preserve its discretionary voting 
authority by disclosing in its proxy materials the nature of any proposal it has been 
advised may be presented, and the manner in which the company intends to exercise 
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prevent the use of discretionary authority by engaging in a counter 
solicitation.94 
The Commission eventually had second thoughts about the 
approach and proposed to change the interpretation.  Amendments 
to Rule 14a-4 would have required that companies receiving “adequate 
notice” of a proposal provide shareholders with the right to withhold 
discretionary authority.95  Moreover, companies were required to 
include “a discussion of the nature” of any proposal96 and provide 
sufficient information to ensure that shareholders could make an 
informed decision.97 
The intended revision engendered substantial opposition.  
Objections fell into two broad categories.  Some focused on the 
logistical consequences of the approach.  Describing the amendment 
as “troublesome,”98 they argued that the change would make the 
 
its discretion.”).  
 94  See Idaho Power Co., supra note 90, at *1 (“Assuming Adequate Notice, a 
company could not, however, exercise discretionary authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(1) 
with respect to voting on any matter that is the subject of an opposing proxy solicitation 
so long as the proponent delivers a proxy statement and form of proxy to holders of a 
majority of the shares entitled to vote on the matter or, if a greater percentage is 
required under applicable law to carry the proposal, holders of the minimum 
required.  In this circumstance, it is the Division’s view that the matter should be 
reflected on the company’s proxy card. If not, discretionary authority would not apply 
to the matter.”).  See also Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21 
(Sept. 18, 1997) (“Under the no-action letters, the company loses its voting discretion, 
however, once the proponent commences a proxy solicitation and solicits the 
percentage of holders required to carry the proposal.”). 
 95  Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *22 (Sept. 18, 1997) 
(“[T]he company would be required to provide shareholders who execute and return 
proxies an opportunity to withhold discretionary authority, albeit only on those 
matters for which it received adequate notice and which it described in its proxy 
statement.”). 
 96  Id. (“The new rule would permit the exercise of such authority if the proxy 
materials include: (i) in the proxy statement, a discussion of the nature of the matters 
and how the company intends to exercise its discretion on each matter, and (ii) on 
the proxy card, a cross-reference to the discussion in the proxy statement and a box 
allowing shareholders to withhold discretionary authority from management to vote 
on the same matter(s).”). 
 97  Id. (“Under that rule, companies must provide shareholders with sufficient 
information to make informed voting decisions as well as a meaningful opportunity to 
review the information.”). 
 98  Letter from D. Craig Nordlund, Chairman, Sec. Law Comm., Am. Soc’y of Corp. 
Sec’y, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 8, 1997), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/nordlun1.htm [hereinafter Nordlund 
Letter] (“Although we agree that there needs to be clarification of the rules 
concerning a company’s discretion to vote uninstructed proxies when a proponent 
chooses to act outside the scope of rule 14a-8, we find the proposed revision of rule 
14a-4 to be especially troublesome.”). 
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tallying process more complicated.99  Others expressed concern over 
the degree of required disclosure100 and the difficulty of obtaining the 
information needed for the proxy statement.101 
Most of the comments, however, focused on the ability of 
shareholders to avoid the limitations contained in Rule 14a-8.102  
Although the rule was never intended to be the exclusive method for 
making proposals, issuers and their supporters essentially claimed that 
it was.  Bringing proposals directly to the meeting amounted to an 
“abuse”103 and a “back door” around the rule,104 rendering Rule 14a-8 
 
 99  Letter from Martin S. Wagner, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Xerox, Inc., to Jonathan 
G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 21, 1997), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/wagner1.htm [hereinafter Xerox 
Letter] (“The addition of the box could create unnecessary complications in the 
solicitation and proxy counting process.”).  See also Letter from Alan Bulliner, Assoc. 
Gen. Counsel, Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 31, 
1997), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/morelan1.txt [hereinafter 
Burlington N. Santa Fe Letter] (“The Company is concerned that the proposed 
revision would foist new burdens on companies while at the same time encourage 
proposals which circumvent the 14a-8 process.”).  
 100  Burlington N. Santa Fe Letter, supra note 99 (allowing shareholders to withhold 
discretionary authority for non-rule 14a-8 proposals would cause companies to “feel 
compelled to provide greater discussion of the non-14a-8 proposal and, as a result, 
encourage erosion of the entire 14a-8 process”).  See also Letter from Alan Bulliner, 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bell Atlantic, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 13, 1997), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/bulline1.txt [hereinafter Bell Atlantic 
Letter] (“Also, referencing such a proposal in corporate proxy materials will no doubt 
result in the inclusion of immaterial proposals at the expense of all shareholders.”). 
 101  Nordlund Letter, supra note 98 (“As proposed, companies would have the 
burden of providing shareholders with sufficient information to make informed voting 
decisions.  Depending on the sophistication of the proponent and the coherence of 
communication to the company about the proposal, this could be a difficult or 
impossible requirement for a company to meet.”).  
 102  Nordlund Letter, supra note 98 (“We are concerned that under the proposed 
changes, proponents would have complete flexibility to put matters before 
shareholders free of all the reasonable requirements and restraints of rule 14a-8.  For 
example, proponents could submit as many proposals as they wish; there would be no 
minimum share ownership requirement; resubmission thresholds would not apply; 
and there would be no restriction on the nature of the subject matter that could be 
presented.”).  See also Xerox Letter, supra note 99 (“The potential effect of the 
proposed changes in 14a-4 would be to tilt the playing field away from 14a-8 as a way 
to avoid the criteria of that Rule.  Thus, there would be no minimum share ownership 
requirement, no resubmission thresholds and no restriction on the nature of the 
subject matter that could be presented.”). 
 103  Burlington N. Santa Fe Letter, supra note 99 (“Submission of last minute 
proposals can be especially vexing as a company finalizes its proxy materials.  In recent 
years, there appears to have been a proliferation of non-14a-8 proposals submitted for 
tactical or harassment purposes.  These efforts to avoid the procedural and substantive 
requirements of Rule 14a-8 abuse the process.”). 
 104  Bell Atlantic Letter, supra note 100 (“The problem is that the proposed revision 
would still permit shareholders to use Rule 14a-4(c) as a back door to force a proxy 
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“useless.”105  As one company put it: 
Our fear is that this amendment might have the 
unintended effect of creating two distinct regulatory schemes 
governing shareholder proposals.  Moreover, we are 
concerned that under the proposed amendments proponents 
would have the flexibility to choose to ignore the restraints 
provided in Rule 14a-8.  The amended provisions do not limit 
the number of proposals a single proponent may submit, do 
not impose a minimum share ownership requirement, do not 
impose a resubmission threshold requirement, and do not 
provide any limitations on the subject matter that may be 
presented.  Finally, companies would have the burden of 
providing information to shareholders sufficient for them to 
make informed voting decisions.  This task might prove 
impossible, depending on the coherence of the 
communication by the proponent to the company.106 
Ultimately, the Commission declined to adopt the amendment.  
The Release ignored shareholder support and instead amended the 
rule to codify the informal interpretation set out in Idaho Power.107  
 
statement discussion on proposals which an issuer has been advised by counsel are 
excludable.”).  Or as some described, an “end run” around the rule.  See Letter from 
Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 31, 1997),  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/manning2.txt (“In general, we do not 
believe Rule 14a-4 should be available to shareholders who wish to make an ‘end-run’ 
around the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal process.  In this regard, some of the 
changes proposed to Rule 14a-4(c) would make it both more burdensome for 
companies to address non-Rule 14a-8 proposals, and would encourage shareholders 
to bypass the Rule 14a-8 procedures, possibly resulting in more ‘personal’ proposals of 
little interest to shareholders generally.”).  See also Letter from Hewlett-Packard Co., to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 23, 1997), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/norlund1.htm (“We are very concerned 
that the 14a-4 end-run used by many shareholder proponents has created a dual track 
for shareholder proposals which vitiates the 14a-8 process.  The ‘fix’ proposed in the 
release does not go far enough to fix this problem.  In fact, it seems to validate the 
process by merely pushing back the required notice period.”). 
 105  Letter from Jeffrey R. Moreland, Senior Vice President, Burlington N. Santa Fe 
Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 31, 1997), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/morelan1.txt (“BNSF believes that, on 
balance, the proposed revisions to Rule 14a-4 would actually facilitate and encourage 
14a-4 proposals.  Indeed, the proposed revisions, if adopted, might encourage 
proponents whose 14a-8 proposals have been excluded to resubmit them under 14a-
4.”). 
 106 Letter from Diane A. Ward, Senior Counsel, Atl. Richfield Co., to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 24, 1997), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/ward1.txt.  
 107  As one shareholder stated: “CalPERS does not believe that company 
management needs this advantage, particularly when the proponent has not chosen 
to impose upon the company the cost of distributing its proposal through submission 
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Companies could obtain discretionary authority to vote against Non-
Rule 14a-8 proposals so long as shareholders received adequate 
disclosure.108  In doing so, the Commission reasoned that shareholders 
benefited by avoiding “confusing” proxy cards.109 
The final rule included only one exception.  Discretionary 
authority could not be used where companies were notified of a 
counter-solicitation.110  Nonetheless, the rule made the exception 
difficult to use.  Shareholders had to agree to deliver a proxy statement 
and proxy card to at least “the percentage of the company’s voting 
shares required under applicable law to carry the proposal,”111 an 
apparent attempt to overturn existing shareholder practices.112  
Moreover, to alleviate an issuer “dilemma,”113 the rule required the 
 
under Rule 14a-8.  Most companies have the ability to amend their bylaws to require 
advance notice of matters to be presented from the floor, should they believe this 
notice is truly necessary.  This is an area where Commission action is not necessary.”  
Letter from Kayla Gillan, Gen. Counsel, Calpers, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 
10, 1997), https://corpgo.fatcow.com/calpers/CalPERS14a-8comments.html. 
 108  The Commission also retreated on the degree of disclosure required when 
invoking discretionary authority.  Rather than require a “discussion” of the non-14a-8 
proposal, the standard set out in the proposing release, companies only had to “advise” 
shareholders of the impending proposals.  The final rule simply included a reminder 
of the impact of the antifraud provisions.  Amendments to Rules on Shareholder 
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40018, 1998 WL 254809, at *7 (May 21, 1998) 
(“We remind you that the disclosure prescribed by amended rule 14a-4(c)(2), as with 
any disclosure item, must take into account the disclosure requirements of the proxy 
anti-fraud rule.”).  
 109  Id. (“Some stated that a voting box permitting shareholders to withhold 
discretionary voting authority in some circumstances may be confusing if shareholders 
are also independently solicited by the proponent in support of the same proposal.  
We agree that inclusion of the proposed box on companies’ proxy cards may be 
confusing in some circumstances.”). 
 110  Id. at *8 (“The final rule therefore precludes a company from exercising 
discretionary voting authority on matters as to which it has received adequate advance 
notice if the proponent provides the company as part of that notice with a statement 
that it intends to solicit the percentage of shareholder votes required to carry the 
proposal, followed with specified evidence that the stated percentage had actually 
been solicited.”). 
 111  See SEC Solicitation of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i) (2012).  The 
adopting release suggests that the solicitation must be for a “significant percentage” of 
the outstanding shares.  As a practical matter, however, a precatory proposal will be 
adopted when receiving a majority of the shares cast on the matter.  As a result, there 
is no fixed percentage of outstanding shares required to approve a precatory proposal.  
 112  Coffee, supra note 91, at 619–21 (“A preferred tactic appears to be to rely not 
on Rule 14a-8, but instead to file an actual proxy solicitation covering the proposed 
bylaw amendment and then only solicit a limited number of shareholders in order to 
avoid unnecessary expense.”). 
 113  Amendments to Rules on Shareholders Proposals, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *21 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“For instance, if the 
shareholder proponent files preliminary proxy materials after the company has filed 
its own proxy statement, or even after the company has mailed its definitive proxy 
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submission of the written notification114 well before the 
commencement of the solicitation process.115 
IV. PREVENTING THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY 
The amendments adopted in 1998 effectively ended any pretense 
that the proxy rules duplicated rather than restricted the rights of 
shareholders exercisable at the meeting.  Discretionary authority could 
be used to vote against proposals made at the meeting that were 
unknown to management.  Discretionary authority could be used to 
vote against proposals made at the meeting but “omitted” under Rule 
14a-8.  Finally, discretionary authority could be used to vote against 
proposals made at the meeting that were known to management so 
long as shareholders were provided “advice on the nature of the 
matter.”116 
The proxy card was not required to offer a mechanism for 
preventing the transfer of discretionary authority.  Transfer could only 
be blocked by withholding of the proxy card.  The failure to return a 
proxy card, however, came at a cost.  Shareholders either had to 
physically attend the meeting and cast a ballot or entirely forego their 
voting rights. 
Particularly in the case of institutional investors, the option of not 
voting raised potential legal concerns.  The decision could conflict 
with their fiduciary obligations.117  At the same time, however, actual 
attendance was, for the most part, an unacceptable alternative.  For 
 
statement and form of proxy to shareholders, the company may be placed in a 
dilemma of either including the shareholder’s proposal on its proxy card, or risking 
the delay and expense of a last-minute resolicitation.  That is because the company 
may not know whether the shareholder intends to begin to solicit proxies 
independently by circulating his/her own proxy card, along with the definitive version 
of his or her proxy statement, or how many shareholders will be solicited if such a 
solicitation is actually launched.”). 
 114  Thus, knowledge that a counter-solicitation was likely would not be enough to 
prevent the exercise of discretionary authority if not submitted in writing.  See Thomas 
W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporate Corporate Governance 
Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 55 n.328 (2001) (“Even 
if management has reason to know that dissident shareholders may subsequently 
launch an independent anti management proxy solicitation, management can retain 
discretionary authority by disclosing its knowledge and intent to use its discretionary 
authority to vote against dissident proposals if they are made.”).  
 115  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i) (2012) (requiring written notice at least forty-
five days before the date proxy materials were solicited the prior year or the date 
specified in an advance notice bylaw). 
 116  Rule 14a-4(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2) (2012). 
 117  See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20, 2014 WL 2965312, at *1 (June 30, 2014) 
(“As a fiduciary, an investment adviser owes each of its clients a duty of care and loyalty 
with respect to services undertaken on the client’s behalf, including proxy voting.”). 
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one thing, the shareholder would need to travel to the meeting site, an 
obvious expense.118  Attendance also presented opportunity costs.  The 
time could be spent doing something else more useful. 
For investors with broad portfolios, actual attendance also raised 
serious logistical impediments.  Annual meetings for public companies 
are bunched over a short period of time.  In 2013, almost seventy 
percent of the companies in the Fortune 500 and Russell 3000 held 
their meetings in April, May, and June.119  As a result, pension plans 
and mutual funds could find themselves needing to vote in hundreds, 
if not thousands, of meetings in a compacted period of time.  
Attendance at all or most of the meetings would be practically 
impossible. 
Nor were these the only difficulties.  For the most part, 
shareholders held their investments not as record owners120 but in 
street name accounts.121  Shares were purchased through an account at 
a broker and titled in the name of a depository.  During the meeting 
process, the depository executed an omnibus proxy and transfers 
voting rights to the brokers.122  As a result, brokers, not street name 
owners, received the proxy cards and returned them to the company, 
thereby providing management with discretionary authority.123 
Street name owners seeking to avoid the transfer of discretionary 
 
 118  To the extent the company held a virtual meeting, physical attendance would 
be unnecessary.  Shareholders would still, however, incur the opportunity costs 
associated with attendance.  See Coffee, supra note 91, at 620 (“Clearly, attendance at 
the shareholder meeting in person in order to vote is too costly an alternative.”). 
 119  See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR. & LISA CASEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 455–56 (2d ed. 
2016). 
 120  Direct registration provides a mechanism for ensuring that shareholders are 
given record title to shares.  See Transfer Agent Regulations, Exchange Act Release No. 
76743, 2015 WL 9311555, at *14 (Dec. 22, 2015) (“In 1996, the Direct Registration 
System (“DRS”) was implemented, which allowed investors to hold uncertificated 
securities in registered form directly on the books of the issuer’s transfer agent.”).  The 
DRS allows investors to “retain the rights of registered owners, without having the 
responsibility of holding and safeguarding securities certificates.”  Concept Release on 
the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 62495, 2010 WL 2779423 (July 14, 
2010).  As a result, shareholders holding shares in this manner would receive a proxy 
card directly from the company and need not obtain a proxy from the broker.  
 121  Transfer Agent Regulations, Exchange Act Release No. 76743, 2015 WL 
9311555, at *16 (“The vast majority of security holders in the U.S. are beneficial owners 
rather than registered owners.”). 
 122  For a discussion of this system of ownership, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The 
Shareholder Communication Rules and the Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in 
Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 683 (1988) [hereinafter Brown, The Shareholder 
Communication Rules]. 
 123  Before returning the proxy card to the company, brokers solicit voting 
instructions from street name owners.  See Brown, The Shareholder Communication Rules, 
supra note 122, at 704. 
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authority must first reclaim from the broker the voting power for their 
shares.124  Broadridge, the agent typically used by brokers in 
connection with the proxy distribution process, allows street name 
owners to obtain a “legal” proxy.125  The process results in the broker 
appointing the street name owner as the agent to vote the shares.126  
The broker also must notify the company “of the number of proxies 
sent to customers and the identifying numbers and shares represented 
by such proxies.”127 
Once in possession of the “legal” proxy, street name owners can 
prevent the transfer of discretionary voting authority.  They may 
decline to return the card, causing the shares not to be present at the 
meeting for voting purposes.  Alternatively, they may attend the 
meeting and vote by ballot.128  The process of obtaining a “legal” proxy 
and voting at the meeting has been described as “cumbersome and 
expensive.”129 
 
 124  Exchange Act Release No. 29340, 2010 WL 2779423, at *8 n.50 (“Beneficial 
owners may, however, request a proxy and attend the shareholder meeting.  It is our 
understanding that both banks and broker-dealers will issue a proxy that the beneficial 
owner may use to attend a meeting if requested to do so.”). 
 125  For a version of the “legal proxy,” see Sample Legal Proxy, 
MATERIALS.PROXYVOTE.COM, 
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/EPLST1/20100210/OTHER_52009/PD
F/broadridge-cis2010_0059.pdf.  The legal proxy includes the CUSIP number for the 
relevant class of shares, the number of shares, and the identity of the street name 
owner.  See NYSE Rule 451.30, 
http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&
manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/ (setting out procedures for sending signed proxies 
to customers, including “a code number for identification and the exact number of 
shares held of record for the account of the customer” and “appropriate 
instructions”). 
 126  Broadridge will subtract any shares subject to a “legal” proxy from the total 
number of shares held by the broker.  See Email from Chuck Callan, Senior Vice 
President Regulatory Affairs, Broadridge, Fin. Sols., Inc., to author (Feb. 3, 2016, 6:38 
MT) (on file with the author). 
 127  NYSE Rule 451.30(3), 
http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&
manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/.  The information does not include the identity of 
the beneficial owner.  As a result, the broker is obligated to send a follow up 
communication to encourage return of the proxy upon the request of the issuer.  Id. 
at 451.30(4). 
 128  Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 52926, 2005 
WL 3610280, at *10 n.57 (Dec. 8, 2005) (“A beneficial owner could execute a proxy 
directly if the intermediary (the holder of record) has appointed the beneficial owner 
as its proxy with respect to the beneficial owner’s shares.”).  
 129  Letter from Glenn Davis, Dir. of Research, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 8, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2014/petn4-672.pdf.  (“The only tested and 
certain way for a shareholder to vote freely for his or her individually preferred 
combination of director candidates is to attend the meeting in person—obtaining a 
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V. THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON SHAREHOLDERS: A CASE STUDY 
For the most part, companies cannot obtain discretionary 
authority to vote on matters set out in the proxy statement and proxy 
card.130  Shareholders planning to raise matters at the meeting, 
therefore, have an incentive to invoke Rule 14a-8 and seek to include 
the proposal in the company’s proxy statement.  This is not, however, 
always possible.  The Commission has interpreted the requirements of 
the rule to summarily exclude certain substantive topics otherwise 
important to investors. 
A. Auditor Qualifications 
A critical example of this categorical approach involves the 
exclusion of proposals relating to the selection or qualification of the 
independent auditor.  The importance of auditors and auditor 
independence to investors is widely recognized.131  As one 
Commissioner at the SEC described: “When an investor puts money 
into a far off corporate enterprise, the auditor is an independent 
accounting professional who serves as the eyes and ears of the 
investor.”132 
Despite the importance of the relationship, the staff of the 
Commission has categorically allowed for the exclusion of almost every 
proposal addressing auditors.  In a misreading of the “ordinary 
 
‘legal proxy’ from the broker if the shareholder holds its shares in ‘street name’ and 
is not the record holder—and vote on the manual ballots distributed.  This is a 
cumbersome and expensive process that only the most sophisticated and deep-
pocketed shareholders understand and may consider pursuing.”). 
 130  They do have the right to vote on matters left blank in the proxy card.  See supra 
Section III.A. 
 131  See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 516–17 (3d Cir. 1947) 
(“[T]he auditing of the books of a corporation is a proper subject for stockholder 
consideration and action.  Surely the audit of a corporation’s books may not be 
considered to be peculiarly within the discretion of the directors.  A corporation is run 
for the benefit of its stockholders and not for that of its managers.”). 
 132   Kara M. Stein, SEC, Accountants and Capital Markets in an Era of Digital 
Disruption, Remarks at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
and BritishAmerican Business (Sept. 9, 2015) (transcript available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-inst-chartered-acctnts.html).  See also 
Daniel L. Goelzer, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the Post-Enron Era, Address at Columbia University Law Center, Center for 
Japanese Legal Studies (Aug. 2, 2005) (transcript available at 
https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/08022005_GoelzerSOXAuditorOversight.
aspx) (“Unlike other gatekeepers, it has always been recognized, at least in theory if 
not always in practice, that the auditor has important obligations to the investing 
public that may require him or her to act contrary to the interests of the client. . . .  
Fundamentally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to refocus auditor[s] on their obligations 
to public shareholders.”).  
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business” exclusion,133 proposals have been omitted that relate to the 
“method of selecting the auditor”134 or “more generally” proposals that 
relate to the “management of the independent auditor’s 
engagement . . . .”135 
As a result, the Commission has permitted the exclusion of 
proposals addressing auditor rotation, irrespective of the period of 
time involved.136  The same is true for proposals requesting changes to 
 
 133  SEC Solicitation of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2012).  Indeed, when 
adopting the exclusion in subsection (i)(5), or matters not significantly related to a 
company’s business, the Commission described shareholder ratification as a 
“traditional shareholder proposal[] . . . .”  Solicitations of Proxies, Exchange Act 
Release No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400, at *2 (Sept. 22, 1972) (“Also, the provision is not 
intended to serve as a basis for the omission of traditional shareholder proposals 
dealing with stockholder relationships with the management, such as cumulative 
voting, annual meetings, and ratification of auditors, since all these matters can be 
considered significantly related to the issuer’s business or within its control.”). 
 134  The phrase was first used in 2001.  See SONICblue Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 
WL 306189, at *9 (Mar. 23, 2001) (describing exclusion of proposal requesting “that 
the board of directors have the auditor selected annually by shareholder vote” under 
(i)(7) as relating to “the method of selecting independent auditors”). 
 135  The phrase first appeared in 2010.  See Masco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 
WL 4922393, at *1, *4 (Jan. 13, 2010) (excluding proposal requesting that board 
“adopt a resolution requiring that Masco limit the term of engagement of its 
independent auditors to a maximum of five years” as relating “to limiting the term of 
engagement of Masco’s independent auditors,” and noting that “[p]roposals 
concerning the selection of independent auditors or, more generally, management of 
the independent auditor’s engagement, are generally excludable under rule 14a-
8(i)(7)”).  The phrase now routinely appears in no action letters relating to auditors.  
See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 147300 (Mar. 5, 
2010); Deere & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 4551548 (Nov. 18, 2011); U.S. 
Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 5998983 (Dec. 16, 2011); Stanley Black & 
Decker, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 5927450 (Dec. 15, 2011); The Walt 
Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 5187234 (Nov. 23, 2011). 
 136  See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176503, at *1 (Jan. 18, 
1991) (providing that the company “shall hire a new and different accounting firm 
starting the four year period” as relating to “the method and criteria used to determine 
the independent auditor selected”); see also S. New England Telecomm. Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1991 WL 178481 (Feb. 11, 1991); ConAgra Foods, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2002 WL 1334815 (June 14, 2002); Bank of Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2003 WL 40624 (Jan. 2, 2003); The Allstate Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 
360106 (Feb. 5, 2003); Am. Fin. Gr., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1058529 
(Apr. 4, 2002).  See also Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 
71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4, 189 (1992) (“In addition, while shareholders routinely vote at 
annual meetings on auditors, they cannot, under the ordinary business exclusion, 
suggest other auditors or even recommend that auditors be rotated from time to 
time.”). 
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the auditor,137 the adoption of specified qualifications,138 or the 
development of data on “auditor reputation.”139  Exclusion has also 
been permitted of proposals seeking a “justification for the retention 
of the same audit firm”140 or “information about the company’s policies 
or practices of periodically considering audit firm rotation. . . .”141  
Proposals seeking information on the “financial capacity” of the 
auditor were likewise excluded.142  Efforts to obtain reconsideration of 
 
 137  Refac, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 834233, at *1 (Mar. 27, 2002) 
(requesting that “the board take the necessary steps to change the public accounting 
firm engaged for the annual independent audit and to amend and improve corporate 
disclosure practices” as relating to the “changing the current auditor” and the 
disclosure of ordinary business matters”). 
 138  Comty. Bancshares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 166982, at *1–2 (Mar. 
15, 1999) (commenting on proposal seeking to amend “the bylaws to require that the 
independent auditor be a regional or national certified public accounting firm and 
that the audit committee consist of independent directors” excluded under (i)(7) as 
relating to the “selection and qualification of auditors” with letter stating that “[w]e 
note in particular that the Wittmeier proposal requires the independent auditor be a 
regional or national certified accounting firm”). 
 139  Cleveland-Cliffs Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 942982, at *1 (Mar. 4, 
2003) (stating exclusion of proposal requesting that the “board of directors to conduct 
an annual, shareholder poll of auditor reputation and release the results of the poll to 
the news media” under (i)(7) as relating to “the company’s selection of independent 
auditors”); USG Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 942651, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2003) 
(stating exclusion of proposal requesting that the “board of directors to conduct an 
annual, shareholder poll of auditor reputation and release the results of the poll to 
the news media” under (i)(7) as relating to “the company’s selection of independent 
auditors”). 
 140  Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 292179, at *1 (Jan. 28, 2003) 
(stating exclusion of proposal requesting that “the Board of Directors require the audit 
committee to include in its committee report and recommendation: (1) the number 
of consecutive years of service by the independent auditor and (2) if in excess of five 
consecutive years, a clear justification for the retention of the same audit firm for such 
extended period” under (i)(7) as relating to the “disclosure of the method of selecting 
independent auditors”); see also Loews Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 292196, 
at *1 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
 141  Comp. Scis. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1119677, at *1 (May 3, 2012) 
(containing a proposal requesting “that the board audit committee prepare and 
disclose to shareholders an annual ‘Audit Firm Independence Report’” that included 
“information about the company’s policies or practices of periodically considering 
audit firm rotation, seeking competitive bids from other public accounting firms for 
audit engagement, and assessing the risks that may be posed to the company by the 
long-tenured relationship of the audit firm with the company,” with the staff noting 
that proposals “concerning the selection of independent auditors or, more generally, 
management of the independent auditor’s engagement”); see also McKesson Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1023667 (May 3, 2012); Xilinx, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2012 WL 812910 (May 3, 2012); CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 
1574702 (May 3, 2012); Dell, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 748852 (May 3, 
2012); NetApp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1549852 (May 10, 2012). 
 142  Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 17930, at *1 (Jan. 
13, 1998) (allowing for the exclusion of a proposal requesting “that the board provide 
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this approach by the staff has not proved successful.143 
The proposals have been excluded despite the public policy 
implications of the topic.144  At least since the demise of Enron, the role 
of auditors as gatekeepers for shareholders has been a much debated 
topic.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), legislation designed to 
address the concerns arising out of the Enron crisis, created the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) to oversee 
auditors.145  With respect to auditor rotation, SOX mandated a study of 
the practice146 and the PCAOB conducted an extensive examination of 
the matter.147  The European Union also imposed mandatory rotation 
requirements on some public companies.148 
 
certain information about the financial capacity of the Company’s auditors” under 
(c)(7) as relating to “the selection of independent auditors”); LTV Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1998 WL 817825 (Nov. 25, 1998).  See also LTV Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1996 WL 741751, at *1 (Dec. 30, 1996) (allowing for the exclusion of a proposal 
seeking a “report on the financial capacity of its independent auditors to pay claims 
for malpractice, negligence or fraud” as relating to “the company’s selection); 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 33767 (Jan. 22, 1997). 
 143  Likewise, reconsideration of the exclusion of proposals calling for increased 
disclosure failed.  In Computer Sciences Corporation, shareholders sought 
reconsideration of a proposal that sought to require disclosure of an Audit Firm 
Independence Report, a report that among other things called for disclosure of board 
policies with respect to audit rotation.  Comput. Scis., Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2012 WL 2410961 (June 26, 2012).  Shareholders argued that the information was 
important to investors when approving auditors and electing directors.  Id. at *4 
(“There are two shareholder voting contexts in which the information requested in 
the Proposal’s Independence Report is critically important: the election of directors 
and the ratification of the selection of the external audit firm.”).  Reconsideration, 
however, was denied.  Id. at *1 (“On May 3, 2012, we issued our response expressing 
our informal view that Computer Sciences could exclude the proposal from its proxy 
materials for its upcoming annual meeting.  You have asked us to reconsider our 
position.  After reviewing the information contained in your letter, we find no basis to 
reconsider our position.”). 
 144  The proposals were typically excluded under the “ordinary business” exclusion 
contained in Rule 14a-8(i)(7).  The exclusion, however, does not apply to matters of 
important public policy.  See Adrien Anderson, The Policy of Determining Significant Policy 
under Rule 14A-8(i)(7), 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 183 (2016). 
 145  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), 
http://pcaobus.org/About/History/Documents/PDFs/Sarbanes_Oxley_Act_of_200
2.pdf. 
 146  See id. § 207. 
 147  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-216, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: 
REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION 
(2003). 
 148  See European Commission Press Release IP/14/104, European Parliament 
backs Commission proposals on new rules to improve the quality of statutory audit 
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-104_en.htm 
(“Public-interest entities will be required to change their statutory auditors after a 
maximum engagement period of 10 years.  Member States can choose to extend the 
10-year period up to 10 additional years if tenders are carried out, and by up to 14 
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B. Auditor Ratification 
The approach taken with respect to auditor proposals was not 
always so categorical.  This was the case, for example, with respect to 
proposals seeking the authority to ratify the auditor.  As a matter of 
governance, most companies, while not legally required, commonly 
provide shareholders with the right to vote on the outside accounting 
firm.149  In connection with the minority of public companies that did 
not, shareholders sometimes submitted proposals under Rule 14a-8 
requesting the authority.150 
Efforts to exclude these proposals were initially unsuccessful.151  By 
the new millennium, however, the position changed.152  The 
 
additional years in case of joint audit, i.e. if the audited company appoints more than 
one audit firm to carry out its audit.  Calibrated transitional periods taking into 
account the duration of the audit engagement are also foreseen to avoid a cliff effect 
once the new rules apply.”). 
 149  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Politicization of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic 
Discretion, the SEC and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 501, 518 
(2012) [hereinafter Brown, Politicization of Corporate Governance] (“Since the 1930s, 
shareholders have routinely been given the right to ratify a company’s auditors.”). 
 150  Possible Revisions to Audit Committee Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 
75344, 2015 WL 3982031, at *8 (July 1, 2015) (“While the audit committees of listed 
issuers are required to appoint the issuer’s auditors, many issuers solicit the approval 
or ratification of the independent auditors from shareholders.”) (citing Audit 




039.pdf (noting that more than 90 percent of Fortune 100 companies seek annual 
shareholder ratification of the auditor chosen by the audit committee). 
 151  Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107815, at *1 (Mar. 
23, 1987) (not allowing for the exclusion of proposal seeking to have “the shareholders 
elect the Company’s independent auditors annually” under subsection (c)(7)).  The 
position was not surprising.  The Commission had previously acknowledged the 
“significance” of the issue to shareholders.  See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14(a)-
8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders 
(S7-643), Exchange Act Release No. 12598, 1976 WL 160410, at *7 (July 7, 1976) 
(“[P]roposals dealing with cumulative voting rights or the ratification of auditors may 
not be economically significant to an issuer’s business, but they nevertheless have a 
significance to security holders that would preclude their being omitted under this 
provision.”).  Moreover, commentators noted in a matter of fact way the right of 
shareholders under state law to vote on the auditor.  See Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate 
of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549 (1957) 
(“A shareholder always could stand up at a stockholders meeting and make a motion 
that in the future the meeting should be held in some other city, that the auditors 
should be elected by stockholders rather than selected by the directors alone, etc.”). 
 152  See SONICblue, supra note 134; see also Fleetwood Enters., Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2002 WL 32078264, at *1 (Apr. 24, 2002) (discussing exclusion of proposal 
requesting “that Fleetwood select its independent auditor annually by shareowner 
vote” under (i)(7) as relating to “the method of selecting independent auditors”).  
One earlier letter did permit the exclusion of a proposal calling for shareholder 
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Commission did so without reference to the contrary precedent and 
without an explanation for the shift in position.153  The change also 
discounted the public policy implications of the issue154 and the 
 
approval of the auditor. See Excalibur Techs. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 
234151, at *1–2 (May 4, 1998).  The facts, however, were somewhat unique.  In 
Excalibur Techs. Corp., the shareholder submitted a proposal requesting that the 
“appointment of the Company’s independent auditors be subject to approval by the 
shareholders at the annual meeting.”  The company argued that an appointment by 
shareholders would lock the company into a choice that might not be in the best 
interests of shareholders.  Id.  Subsequent proposals would focus on ratification rather 
than appointment.  See infra note 153.   
 153  Paccar, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 111635, at *1 (Jan. 14, 2004) 
(proposal requesting “that the board of directors adopt a policy that the company’s 
independent auditor be submitted to shareholder ratification” under (i)(7) as relating 
to “the method of selecting independent auditors”); HRPT Props. Tr., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2004 WL 224449 (Jan. 28, 2004); USG Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 
224463 (Jan. 28, 2004); Cousins Props. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 334466 
(Feb. 17, 2004); Xcel Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 224479 (Jan. 28, 
2004); Apache Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 224450 (Jan. 25, 2004); Wendy’s 
Int’l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 224543 (Jan. 25, 2004). 
 154  Auditor ratification has been a much debated topic.  With respect to auditor 
ratification, a report from an advisory committee at the Department of the Treasury 
recommended that shareholders in all companies have the authority.  See U.S. DEP’T 
OF TREASURY, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION 
20 (2008).  Calstrs petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 10A-3 to require shareholder 
ratification of auditors.  See Letter from Christopher Ailman, Chief Inv. Officer, Cal. 
State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. Invs., to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 23, 
2008), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-570.pdf.  Given the 
importance of the ratification issue, calls have arisen to bar brokers from voting 
uninstructed shares in connection with auditor approval.  Letter from Brandon J. Rees, 
Deputy Dir., AFL-CIO, to Brent J. Fields Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 8, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-15/s71315-73.pdf (“To make these votes a 
more meaningful reflection of shareholder views, the SEC should also prohibit 
discretionary voting on auditor ratification by brokers for their clients’ uninstructed 
shares as is currently permitted by NYSE Rule 452.”).  Perhaps most noticeably, the 
need for improved disclosure in connection with shareholder ratification of the 
auditor has been widely recognized, including by the Commission.  In a concept 
release, issued in 2015, the Commission noted the shortcomings of the current 
disclosure regime and acknowledged “investors and other stakeholders have requested 
greater transparency about audit committee activities.”  Possible Revisions to Audi 
Committee Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 75344, 2015 WL 3982031, at *8 
(July 1, 2015) (“The rules do not require issuers to provide information about the 
audit committee’s process and reasons that lead to the selection of the independent 
auditor subject to the ratification solicitation.”)  The release recognized the “public 
interest” in the “subject of auditor tenure” and sought “feedback” to better understand 
the types of disclosure that would be useful to investors.  Id. at *9 (“Providing 
additional disclosure about the audit committee’s oversight of the independent 
auditor could further inform investors about the oversight process and provide them 
with useful context for audit committee decisions.  It may also enable investors to 
differentiate between companies based on the quality of audit committee oversight, 
and determine whether such differences in quality of oversight may contribute to 
differences in performance or quality of financial reporting among companies.”). 
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importance of the matter to shareholders.155  It took only a few years 
before the exclusion of ratification proposals became routine.156  
Efforts to convince the Commission to intervene and reverse the 
position were unsuccessful.157 
VI. ANALYSIS 
Auditor related proposals demonstrate the limitations imposed 
on shareholder voting rights under the proxy rules.  Because of their 
subject matter, the proposals are subject to a categorical exclusion 
 
 155  Only one meaningful exception to the categorical exclusion of auditor 
proposals has apparently been made, arising from the deemed importance of the 
subject to the public.  In Safeway, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 398743, at *1 
(February 26, 2002), shareholders requested that the board adopt a policy “that in the 
future the firm that is appointed to be the Company’s independent accountants will 
only provide audit services to the Company and not provide any other services.”  The 
no action relief was not granted given “the widespread public debate concerning the 
impact of non-audit services on auditor independence and the increasing recognition 
that this issue raises significant policy considerations.”  Id.  See also V.F. Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2002 WL 500196, at *1 (March 7, 2002) (refusing to allow exclusion of 
proposal requesting that the board adopt a policy “that the public accounting firm 
retained by our Company to provide audit services, or any affiliated company, should 
not also be retained to provide non-audit-services to our Company” and noting “the 
widespread public debate concerning the impact of non-audit services on auditor 
independence and the increasing recognition that this issue raises significant policy 
considerations”).   
 156  Toys “R” Us, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 448213, at *1 (Feb. 22, 2005) 
(excluding proposal that requests the “board of directors adopt a policy that the 
company’s independent auditor be submitted to shareholder ratification” under 
(i)(7) as relating to “the method of selecting independent auditors”); Qwest 
Commc’ns Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 484382 (Feb. 23, 2005); Xcel 
Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 484394 (Feb. 23, 2005).  See also Brown, 
Politicization of Corporate Governance, supra note 149, at 525 (“Despite the longstanding 
and consistent position of the SEC, the staff unexpectedly concluded, without analysis 
or explanation, that the proposal could be omitted under the ordinary business’ 
exclusion.  The public importance of the debate over auditor independence received 
no mention.  In quick order, the position was repeated in other No-Action letters.  By 
2005, companies routinely received relief authorizing the exclusion of these sorts of 
proposals.”). 
 157  The New York City Pension Funds submitted a number of proposals seeking 
shareholder ratification of the auditor.  In Rite Aid, the Commission concluded that 
the matter related to the “method of selecting independent auditors.”  Rite Aid Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 871029, at *1 (Mar. 31, 2006).  The Funds appealed 
the decision, noting that the earlier letters had allowed for the exclusion of auditor 
ratification proposals “without the benefit of any proponent opposition.”  Id.  Among 
other things, the shareholder emphasized a speech made by the chair of the SEC that 
emphasized “the need for auditor independence.”  Id.  Reconsideration, however, was 
denied and the matter not presented to the Commission.  See Brown, Politicization of 
Corporate Governance, supra note 149, at 526 (“Again without explanation, the staff 
denied the appeal and reaffirmed that auditor selection fell within the ‘ordinary 
business’ exclusion.  The action suggested acquiescence by the Commission in the 
staff’s revised interpretation.”). 
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from the proxy statement.  The only alternative for shareholders 
wanting to debate auditor related issues is to avoid Rule 14a-8 and raise 
the matter directly at the meeting.  Management, however, can use the 
proxy process to obtain the discretionary authority necessary to ensure 
the defeat of the proposal, preventing shareholders from providing 
their collective views on the matter. 
Rule 14a-4 reflects a microcosm in the development of the proxy 
rules.  The proxy rules began with the laudatory purpose of ensuring 
that shareholders received the same rights as those exercisable at the 
meeting.158  The evolution of the proxy rules has reflected the interests 
of issuers159 because shareholders are poorly organized and, at least 
initially, show limited interest in governance reform.160  The practice, 
therefore, was to develop rules that restricted rather than duplicated 
the rights of shareholders. 
This approach can be seen with respect to the development of 
Rule 14a-4.  What ought to have been a highly technical but neutral 
rule designed to ensure the proper exercise of voting authority has 
evolved into a vehicle for limiting voting rights.  A proxy card does not 
provide the same choices as a ballot distributed at the meeting.161  The 
obligation of impartiality additionally remains unenforced,162 with 
 
 158  See Hearings on H.R. 1493, supra note 3. 
 159  The involvement of shareholders in the evolution of the proxy rules increased 
in the new millennium.  See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 
162–63.  
 160  See Freeman, supra note 151, at 552–53 (noting that “the large shareholder is 
not the source of stockholder proposals” but that the rule is used by “a very small 
group” of “small stockholders, either individuals or organizations, with an investment 
to which they are logically or emotionally committed for a long term”). 
 161  Ballots typically include all matters to be voted upon, including all candidates 
seeking a position on the board.  The rules do not, however, permit proxy cards to 
include all choices.  The absence of a universal proxy was the subject of a 
recommendation by the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee. See U.S. SECS. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING SEC 
RULEMAKING TO EXPLORE UNIVERSAL PROXY BALLOTS (2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/universal-proxy-
recommendation-072613.pdf.  It has been added to the reform agenda of the 
Commission.  See Mary Jo White, Chair of SEC, Remarks before the Society of 
Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals: Building Meaningful 
Communication and Engagement with Shareholders (June 25, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/building-meaningful-communication-and-
engagement-with-shareholde.html. 
 162  The Commission does not, for example, ensure that companies clearly title 
shareholder proposals on the proxy card.  See Lincoln Puffer, Note, Proxy Cards and the 
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management permitted to highlight proposals that it favors.163 
Most importantly, however, the rule allows for the involuntary 
transfer of voting rights for proposals known to management well in 
advance of the meeting.164  Shareholders are left with a Hobson’s 
choice of either conceding the transfer or preventing discretionary 
authority by giving up the right to vote.165  Because discretionary 
authority is permitted but not mandated, shareholders could try to 
induce change through private ordering,166 convincing companies to 
forego the authority,167 or to provide a mechanism on the proxy card 
for the withholding of discretionary authority.168  At least one company 
 
 163  Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948 
WL 28695, at *1 (Nov. 5, 1948) (“The draft of Rule X-14A-4 which was circulated for 
public comment contained a provision that the form of proxy should contain no 
recommendation with respect to any matter to be acted upon.  Upon further 
consideration of the matter, after reviewing the comments received, the Commission 
believes that this proposed change in the text of the existing rule would introduce 
ambiguities that would create administrative difficulties in construction and 
application of the rule.  For that reason, this provision has been omitted from the 
amended rule.”). 
 164  See supra note 28. 
 165  See Coffee, supra note 91, at 620 (“[T]he public shareholder faces Hobson’s 
Choice: the shareholder can either grant a proxy to management (knowing that 
management will vote against this proposal) or refrain from voting.”).  As discussed, 
shareholder could block and vote by attending the meeting.  Nonetheless, for the most 
part, this is an impractical solution.  See supra Section III.B.4. 
 166  See SEC Staff Financial Bulletin No. 89, 49 Fed. Reg. 4936 (May 31, 1961), 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1960/
1960_1964_Interprt_Corp_Finance.pdf (no action letter providing that there would 
be “no objection to a provision that a proxy would not be voted unless marked 
notwithstanding that Rule 14a- 4(e) on its face requires that proxies be voted and 
disclosure made of how they would be voted”). 
 167  See Rubbermaid Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 4493, at *3 (Jan. 6, 1994) 
(“The proposal requests that unvoted proxies not be counted.  The Division is unable 
to concur in your view that the proposal and supporting statement are false and 
misleading within the meaning of rule 14a–9.  According, we are unable to concur in 
your view that the proposal may be omitted from the Company’s proxy materials in 
reliance on rule 14a–8(c)(3).  The Division is also unable to concur in your view that 
the proposal is inconsistent with discretionary voting under rule 14a–4(c) or state law 
and therefore excludable under rule 14a–8(c)(1), (c)(2) or (c)(3).  In the staff’s view, 
the cited provisions of federal and state law permit, rather than mandate, the 
discretionary voting of proxies by management.”). 
 168  Some effort at private ordering has been made.  See Rosemary Lally, Carpenters’ 
Fund Continues to Make Progress on Auditor Disclosure, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS 
(July 16, 2015), 
http://www.cii.org/article_content.asp?edition=4&section=13&article=603 
(discussion efforts by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Fund to send 
letters to specified Fortune 500 firms in an effort to obtain information on auditor 
practices, including the tenure of the firm and whether the committee periodically 
considers whether there should be regular rotation of the auditor). 
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has implemented this approach.169  As Chevron’s proxy card provides: 
The proxy holders will vote in accordance with their discretion 
on such other matters as may properly come before the 
meeting and any adjournment or postponement thereof, 
including, without limitation, any proposal to adjourn the 
meeting to a later time and place for the purpose of soliciting 
additional proxies, unless the undersigned strikes out this 
sentence.170 
Private ordering could come about through the submission of 
shareholder proposals on the subject.171  Shareholders could also seek 
to engage in other types of self-help practices that are reminiscent of 
the “just say no” campaigns.172  Shareholders could, for example, 
collectively decide to not return their proxy cards to companies 
seeking discretionary authority deemed excessively broad.  In doing so, 
the shares would not be present at the meeting and could not be used 
for discretionary voting.  Their absence would also potentially impair 
efforts to obtain a quorum or the required percentage of votes needed 
for approval. 
The approach, however, is not likely to be effective.  The efforts 
would confront the logistical difficulties associated with obtaining a 
proxy card.173  Shareholders opting not to return the card would, unless 
attending the meeting or circulating their own proxy statement, be 
 
 169  See also In re Union Electric Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 351, 1958 WL 96119, at *4 (Mar. 
21, 1958) (“Rule X–14A–4 specifically permits the form of proxy to grant discretionary 
authority with respect to stockholder proposals omitted from a proxy statement 
pursuant to Rule X–14A–8, and the situation here comes within the scope of that Rule.  
It appears, as indicated above, that the stockholder may deny the authority in question 
by deletion or insertion in the form of proxy.”). 
 170  See Chevron Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (May 27, 2015) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000119312515123775/d858886d
def14a.htm (language appearing on the back of the proxy card in bold).  For street 
name owners, this authority would also need to appear on the voting instruction form.  
See supra note 43.  
 171  Efforts to exclude proposals calling for an end to discretionary voting have not 
been successful.  See Centerior Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 18741, 
at *1 (Jan. 18, 1995) (exclusion not permitted of proposal providing “that future 
proxies shall have no discretionary voting power on matters where no voting directions 
have been given”).  Of course, most proposals are precatory.  As a result, they advise 
rather than require.  See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 151 
(“Invariably phrased as a recommendation, the proposals advise rather than 
command.”).  To the extent receiving majority support, therefore, the proposals do 
not automatically change behavior but require agreement of management. 
 172  The approach was first suggested by Professor Grundfest.  See Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 903–08 (1993). 
 173  See supra Section IV. 
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forced to give up their voting rights.  Large investors with fiduciary 
obligations would be unlikely to take these steps.  As a result, support 
among the largest shareholders would remain low.  In any event, 
private ordering would be a slow and difficult method of implementing 
reform.174 
Changes to the rule are, therefore, necessary.175  The proxy rules 
require updating to reflect the current state of corporate governance, 
particularly the more cooperative and interactive relationship between 
owners and managers.176  The goal would be a return to first principals 
and seek to ensure that the rules duplicated as much as possible the 
rights provided shareholders at the meeting.  This would require two 
sets of changes to Rule 14a-4. 
First, the rule should eliminate the right of companies to vote 
partially completed proxies.  The Commission recognized, in the 
aborted reform efforts of 1979, that the evidence did not support the 
conclusion that a partially executed card reflects an intent by investors 
to allow management to vote the unmarked portions.177  As currently 
configured, therefore, management has the ability to vote shares in a 
manner inconsistent with shareholder intent. 
Second, the rule should be amended to address the problem of 
discretionary voting.  One possibility would be to eliminate the practice 
entirely.  In some circumstances, however, the ability of management 
to obtain voting discretion is arguably in the interests of investors.  For 
matters genuinely unknown a reasonable time before the meeting, 
shareholders can benefit by having the matter resolved by persons 
obligated to act in their best interests.178 
 
 174  In proposing a rule to provide shareholder access to the company’s proxy 
statement for their nominees, the Commission specifically rejected arguments that the 
matter should be left to private ordering, at least where the reform sought to facilitate 
the exercise of shareholder rights guaranteed under state law.  See Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 62764, 2010 WL 
3343532  (Aug. 25, 2010) (“[W]e have reason to believe that reliance on private 
ordering under state law would be insufficient to meet our goal of facilitating the 
exercise of shareholders’ traditional state law rights to nominate and elect directors.”). 
 175  The Commission has sometimes noted the need to amend the proxy rules to 
eliminate unnecessary restrictions on shareholder suffrage.  See Facilitating 
Shareholder Dir. Nominations, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 60089, 2009 WL 
1953653, at *5 (June 10, 2009) (“[W]e believe that parts of the federal proxy process 
may unintentionally frustrate voting rights arising under state law, and thereby fail to 
provide fair corporate suffrage.”). 
 176  See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 179–80. 
 177  See supra note 53. 
 178  The authority to vote rests with the person appointed as the proxy.  The 
presence of fiduciary obligations depends upon the identity of the proxy.  To the 
extent an officer or director, the proxy will have the requisite duties.  See supra note 
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Other than unexpected matters, however, the argument for 
discretionary authority—at least discretionary authority transferred on 
an involuntary basis—is much weaker.  To the extent management has 
adequate notice of a proposal to be made at the meeting, shareholders 
should have a say in the outcome.  This is true for any matter submitted 
in a timely fashion, whether omitted under Rule 14a-8 or submitted as 
a “Non-Rule 14a-8 Proposal.”179  In those circumstances, the proxy 
statement should disclose the matters and the proxy card (and by 
extension the voting instruction form) should provide a mechanism 
for shareholders to vote for or against the proposal.  Alternatively, the 
card could provide a mechanism to withhold discretionary voting.180 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of the proxy rules during their first half-century of 
existence did not always reflect the legitimate interests of shareholders.  
The rules sometimes reduced the rights that existed under state law.181  
In particular, this occurred in connection with voting rights.  Under 
Rule 14a-4, shareholders were subjected to an involuntary transfer of 
voting rights to management to resolve any proposal that did not 
appear in the proxy statement but arose from the floor of the 
meeting.182  The only practical way to prevent the transfer was to forsake 
voting rights at the meeting.183 
The evolution of the proxy rules has, however, become more 
balanced.184  Yet the vestiges of earlier eras remain in place.  As the 
 
41. 
 179  See supra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3. 
 180  Two mechanisms have been suggested.  Chevron provided an opportunity to 
simply cross out the language authorizing discretionary authority.  See supra note 170.  
The Commission, on the other hand, proposed that proxy cards include “a box to 
withhold discretionary authority.”  Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 
Exchange Act Release No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *41 (Sept. 18, 1997). 
 181  JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 342 (Del. Ch. 
2008) (“Rule 14a-8 is a compromise that allows for the presentation of some 
shareholder proposals without the cost of soliciting proxies, but what a shareholder 
may do under Rule 14a-8 is far different than what a shareholder may do on his or her 
own.”), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2008).  
 182  See supra Section III. 
 183  See supra Section IV. 
 184  See Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8, supra note 10, at 152 (“Once the Rule 
was rewritten into plain English in 1998, evolution became more balanced. Indeed, in 
2010, the Commission amended Rule 14a-8 in order to narrow one of the 
exclusions.”).  In 2010, the Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to narrow the scope of 
exemption (i)(8).  See Nicole L. Jones, Note, Shareholder Proposals, Director Elections, and 
Proxy Access: The History of the SEC’s Impediments to Shareholder Franchise, DENV. L. REV. 
ONLINE (May 6, 2016), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-
onlinearticle/2016/5/6/shareholder-proposals-director-elections-and-proxy-access-
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 approaches its 82nd anniversary, care 
needs to be taken so that the relevant rules and regulations retain their 
vitality and effectiveness, reflecting not just the corporate governance 
structure in place during the Great Depression, but also those that 
exist today.  In the proxy area, this means returning to a simpler, more 
neutral, approach that better reflects the interests of all of the 
participants in the corporate governance debate. 
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